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TWO ESSAYS ON MANAGERIAL HORIZON, CASH HOLDINGS AND EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
Sanjib Guha 
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Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung
U.S. corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile o f cash. Academicians and 
practitioners alike have tried to understand the reasons why companies are holding on to 
so much cash. Numerous studies have explored the various motives for holding cash. 
Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm 
characteristics. This dissertation analyzes the correlations that exist between excess cash 
holding and some measurable managerial characteristics. This dissertation examines if 
managerial horizon has any impact on excess cash holding. It also examines if managerial 
horizon and excess cash has any impact on firm value. Four different measures of 
managerial horizon were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are 
based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next 
two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion o f current 
compensation and proportion o f future compensation.
The results clearly show that CEO Age and the proportion o f CEO’s compensation 
(current and future) do determine level o f cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs 
hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as 
CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy.
CEOs who receive more o f their compensation in future payments also hold on to more 
cash, whereas CEOs who receive more o f their compensation in current payments hold 
less cash. This makes intuitive sense because a CEO whose higher proportion o f 
compensation is going to be paid in the future is more likely to conserve cash to better 
facilitate its future payments. This dissertation also shows that as companies are holding 
on to excess cash, the higher level o f excess cash is having a significant impact on the 
firm value. As expected, the results show that in general firms holding more excess cash 
see a reduction in firm value.
The second essay in this dissertation examines if managerial horizon has any effect on 
earnings management. Earnings are one o f the most important measures o f firm 
performance and previous studies have shown that managers have a tendency to 
manipulate earnings to raise investor demand for a stock. We used a very good 
measurement o f Earnings Management (EM) as propounded by Lee and Masulis (2009) 
to see if  it was affected by any o f the four measurable constructs o f managerial horizon. 
The results show that there is no effect o f managerial horizon on earnings management. 
The results show that one o f the important determinants o f earnings management was 
cash flow of the firms, which lends support to the Agency problem facing the firms. The 
results also show that EM does not lead to higher dividend payouts in firms.
Members o f Dissertation Committee: Dr. Mohammad Najand
Dr. David Selover
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ESSAY 1: MANAGERIAL HORIZON AND CASH HOLDINGS 
INTRODUCTION
U.S. corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile o f cash. Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz (2009) report that for the typical firm the average cash-to-assets ratio (cash ratio) 
more than doubled from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. Fresard (2010) shows that cash 
holdings constitute over one-fifth o f a company’s assets. Academicians and practitioners 
alike have tried to find the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. 
Numerous studies have discussed about the various motives for holding cash. Many 
researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics.
According to recent reports, all the major U.S. corporations together have more than $ 1.7 
trillion o f cash reserves. The companies have accumulated so much idle cash that it is 
more than enough to pay off all their debts, academics say that U.S. companies now have 
zero leverage because they have accumulated enough cash to pay off all their debt 
obligations.
Why are U.S. corporations sitting on so much cash, which earns them little or no return? 
One o f the theories that have been propounded more strongly by some corporate CEOs is 
the high corporate tax rate in the United States. John Chambers, the CEO of Cisco, 
appeared on the TV show “60 Minutes” aired on March 27, 2011 and stated that his
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Company has almost $40 billion o f cash overseas, which the company could bring back 
to the U.S. if  there were not a steep tax penalty to pay for repatriation.
Almost all countries tax the income o f corporations that operate within their borders. The 
U.S. and other countries tax the foreign income o f their corporations. U.S. law grants tax 
credits for foreign income taxes paid abroad and companies are permitted to defer U.S. 
tax liabilities until those profits are repatriated. The taxes due upon repatriation is equal 
to the difference between foreign income taxes paid and taxes that would be due if profits 
were taxed at the U.S. rate. For example, assuming that the U.S. corporate tax rate is 35% 
and a U.S. multinational earns $100 abroad on which it pays $15 in host country 
corporate income taxes, an additional $20 would be due in U.S. taxes when the profits are 
repatriated. Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007, did one of the major academic 
studies on a tax-based explanation for higher cash holdings. The authors found that firms 
that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels o f cash.
U.S. corporate tax rate is 35%, which is one o f the highest corporate tax rates in the 
world. Only Brazil, Uzbekistan, Chad and Argentina have higher corporate tax rates than 
the U.S. (Hunkar, 2011). The average corporate tax rate in OECD countries is 18% 
whereas there are many countries with much lower tax rates, such as, China (16%), 
Ireland (10%), Taiwan (10%), Singapore (8%), and Hong Kong (4%).
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Many distinguished people in corporate America such as John Chambers, CEO o f Cisco 
and Saffa Catz, President o f Oracle are calling for a tax holiday on repatriated profits. 
They believe that approximately $ 1 trillion earnings held by American corporations in 
their foreign operations could be repatriated to the U.S. and could be invested in U.S. 
jobs, and capital assets.
Such a holiday was actually carried out as an experiment in 2004, when the effective tax 
rate on repatriated foreign income was reduced from 35% to 5.25%. This one time 
reduction led to increased inflow of foreign source earnings by some $ 312 billion. Out o f 
that money, only $ 73 billion was used to create or retain jobs and $ 75 billion to finance 
new capital spending (Shapiro and Mathur, 2009). Therefore, the concept o f tax holiday 
and especially the possibility o f streamlining and reducing corporate tax rates are under 
active consideration by U.S. lawmakers.
One important thing to remember about corporations is that they endeavor to earn the 
highest return possible, and cash earns very low returns. The investment decisions o f the 
firm and its cash holding policies are determined by the highest level o f management. 
Therefore, it is logical to deduce that the cash holding policy o f a firm is based not only 
by firm characteristics, but also by the personal characteristics o f the CEO of the firm.
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This dissertation examines different facets o f CEO characteristics and tries to determine 
the specific characteristics that make a CEO hold onto excess cash and another to hold 
less o f it. In this dissertation, we seek to extend the literature on cash holdings by 
incorporating the role o f managerial horizon. Managerial horizon determines whether the 
managers are more concerned with the firm’s short-run stock price or with the long-run 
price. Managers with a long horizon place additional emphasis on the firm’s long-term 
value rather than the short-term value; they tend to make cash holding decisions to 
increase the firm’s long-run stock price. In contrast, short-horizon managers stress the 
firm’s short-term performance and make cash holding decisions that enhance the stock 
value in the short run. In this study, we also attempt to establish the link between 
managerial horizon, cash holdings, and firm value. Prior studies suggest that excess cash 
holdings could have either a positive or negative effect on firm value. The impact o f 
managerial horizon on the relation between cash holdings and firm value has not been 
addressed yet in the literature.
We use four different measures o f managerial horizon (MH) to determine their effect on 
cash holding. The first two measures o f MH are based on the Age (AGE) o f the manager 
and how long he has been the CEO (Tenure). The other two measures o f MH are based 
on the composition o f the manager’s compensation: the current salary (MH3) and the 
future salary (MH4). The results show that Age was statistically significant but Tenure 
was never statistically significant. MH3 and MH4 were also statistically significant. The 
results show that as Age increases cash holding decreases, which would imply that
5
younger CEOs hold more cash than older CEOs. MH3 had a negative sign, which implies 
that as less o f the compensation is paid in cash the CEOs tend to hold more cash. MH4 
had a positive sign, which implies that as higher proportion o f compensation is paid in the 
future, the CEOs tend to hold more cash. The other major result in this study is that 
excess cash holding caused by managers’ horizon has a significant negative impact on 
firm value.
The rest o f this paper is structured as follows, Section I compiles the literature review of 
cash holding and managerial horizon, Section II describes the data, Section III explains 
the methodology, Section IV presents the analysis and discusses the results, and Section 
V concludes the paper.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper brings together two different strings o f finance literature, one regarding cash 
holding and the other is regarding managerial horizon. A literature review o f both the 
topics follows:
A. Higher Cash Holding
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) in their study from 1980 -  2006 find that for the typical 
firm the average cash-to-assets ratio (cash ratio) increased by 0.46% every year. In their 
study, they found that the average cash ratio more than doubled over the sample period, 
from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006.
According to the economic and finance literature there are four motives for firms to hold 
cash. The academic research on these motives is reviewed briefly:
a) The transaction motive: Classical finance (e.g. Baumol, 1952, Miller and Orr, 
1966) believe that a firm incurs transaction costs associated with converting a 
non-cash asset into cash and uses cash for payments and there is an optimal level 
o f demand for cash. Transaction motive implies there are economies o f scale 
associated, so large firms hold comparatively less cash. Mulligan, 1997 supported 
the existence o f economies o f scale.
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b) The precautionary motive: When access to capital markets is costly, firms hold 
more cash to better cope with adverse shocks. Firms with riskier cash flows hold 
more cash (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999). Other notable 
research on the precautionary motive was done by (Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach, 2004) and Han and Qiu, 2007.
c) The tax motive: As previously mentioned, Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite 
(2007) find that because the U.S. has such high Corporate tax rate (35%), U.S. 
multinational firms would have to incur huge tax burden if  they repatriated their 
earnings from foreign operations. Therefore, U.S. multinational firms accumulate 
high levels o f cash in foreign countries. So many corporate CEOs and 
academicians such as, Shapiro and Mathur, 2009 are calling for another tax 
holiday for repatriated income from foreign operations.
d) The agency motive: Jensen (1986) argued that entrenched managers would rather 
retain cash than increase payouts to shareholders when the firm has poor 
investment opportunities. Stulz (1990) predicted that shareholders would choose 
to limit managers’ access to free cash flow to mitigate agency conflicts over its 
deployment. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) and Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2004) find cross-country evidence suggesting that firms hold more 
cash in countries with greater agency problems. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) suggest that entrenched managers are 
more likely to build excess cash balances, but spend excess cash quickly.
8
Excess cash holdings by firms has become such a pervasive issue that many researchers 
are trying to identify its causes and effects from various angles. Ran Duchin (2011) has 
studied the relationship between corporate liquidity and diversification and found that 
multi-division firms hold significantly less cash than standalone firms. Laurent Fresard 
(2011) has studied the effects o f cash holdings on product market behavior and found that 
large cash reserves lead to systematic future market -  share gains at the expense o f 
industry rivals.
B. Managerial Horizon
The topic o f managerial horizon is comparatively much less researched. Managerial 
horizon determines whether the managers are more concerned with the firm’s short-run 
stock price or with the long-run price. Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that CEOs in their 
final years o f office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-term 
earnings performance. They find that CEOs spend less on R & D during their final years 
in office. Cheng (2004) addresses the issue o f how firms design CEO incentives to 
overcome potential underinvestment in R&D. He finds that increased R&D expenditures 
are associated with increased stock option grants to CEOs. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
studied career concerns — concerns about the effects o f current performance on future 
compensation. They study optimal contract compensation and they find empirical support 
for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market 
performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) investigate whether and how individual 
managers affect corporate behavior and performance. Stein (1996) studies capital
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budgeting and finds that managerial horizon has significant impact on optimal capital 
budgeting decisions. Sharma and Hsieh (2011) study managerial horizon of the acquired 
and acquiring firms in the framework of Mergers & Acquisitions. Chidambaran and John 
(2010) find that the manager’s investment policy depends on his horizon and the cost o f 
disclosure. Narayanan (1996) studies the incentives that make managers take decisions, 
which yield short-term profits but are not in the stockholders best interests. Kalyta (2009) 
finds income increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when 
CEO pension is based on firm performance. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) study 
financial performance o f the company around CEO turnover. Antia, Pantzalis, and Park 
(2010) find that a short CEO decision horizon is indicative o f preference for investments 
that offer relatively faster paybacks at the expense o f long-term value creation. Huson, 
Wiedman, and Wier (2003) examine how the compensation committee overcomes the 
horizon problem while determining CEO compensation.
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II. DATA
Data about companies and cash holdings was collected from the Compustat database for 
the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). Data was collected for all publicly traded firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (non- ADRs). The sample excludes utilities 
(SIC Codes 4900 to 4949) because these firms are highly regulated, and as is generally 
prevalent, excludes financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999). Data was collected from 
the Compustat database for all companies that were one time or the other listed on the 
NYSE, NASDAX or AMEX over the time 1993 -  2012. Therefore, the data includes 
both surviving and non-surviving firms that appeared on Compustat at any time during 
the sample period. Data was collected for 10,204 companies from the Compustat 
database. The items for which data was collected and their explanations are listed in 
Appendix.
Data about CEO’s age and compensation was collected from the ExecuComp database 
for the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). The items for which data was collected from 
the ExecuComp database and their explanations are listed in Appendix.
Data about the variable “Governance” was collected from the corporate governance index 
as provided by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. It has data from 1994 -  2006 but not for all 
companies and not for all years.
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III. M ETHODOLOGY
We selected a preexisting model from finance literature previously used by Opler et al 
(1999) and Bates et al (2009) that includes all the relevant control variables. We 
augmented the model by the hypothesized independent variable -  managerial horizon to 
study its effect on the level of corporate cash holdings. Specifically, the model used has 
the following specification:
Cash/TA = MH (various proxies) + Sigma + MB + Sales + Realsize + Cashflow/TA + 
NWC/TA + CAPX/TA + Leverage + R&D/Sales + Divdummy + Acquisition/TA ... Eqn 
(1)
The explanation o f each of the variables is provided in Appendix.
The extended regression model looks as follows:
Cash/TA = Age + Tenure + MH3 + MH4 + Govindex + Sigma + MB + Sales + Realsize 
+ Cashflow/TA + NWC/TA + CAPX/TA + Leverage + R&D/Sales + Divdummy + 
Acquisition/TA + firm effect + year e ffec t................................. equation (2)
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IV. RESULTS
The results were obtained by using the SAS program. The means program provided the 
descriptive statistics that is shown in table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The descriptive statistics revealed that since the matching of the various data sets, there 
were lots o f missing values and many variables, which had data that were very far flung 
(outliers). Trying to winsorize all the variables at the top and bottom one percentiles (99 
percentile and 1 percentile) provided a very low number o f observations. This is because 
the corporate governance index data set did not have too many observations to begin 
with. Therefore, instead o f winsorizing all the variables, we winsorized only a few 
variables that had lots o f missing values and outliers. Therefore, the variables that we 
winsorized at 99 percentile and 1 percentile level were CFL, CHE, AT, MKBK and DLC. 
The data set was left with more than 50,000 observations to work with.
The correlation program then provided the correlation matrix for the entire data set. Table 
2 shows the correlation matrix.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The model shows Cash/TA to be the dependent variable but the literature review o f 
previous researchers has shown that they have used other measures o f cash ratio: a) 
Cash/TA, b) Cash/NA, c) Cash/Sales and d) log(Cash/NA). Since this is an extensive 
research, we used an exhaustive list o f all the dependent variables for cash ratio. The cash
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ratios used are: a) Cash/TA, b) Cash/NA, c) Cash/Sales d) log(Cash/NA) e) log(Cash/TA) 
and f) log(Cash/Sales).
We divided, one o f the measures o f managerial horizon, Tenure, into four quartiles and 
grouped the first quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding 
values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. The mean o f the first quartile o f Tenure 
and the mean of the fourth quartile o f tenure and the means o f the corresponding values 
o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA was calculated. A differences o f means test (T -  
test) between the means o f the first quartile o f Tenure and the fourth quartile o f tenure 
was run. The results show that the t-value was 1.89 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically 
significant at 10%, the t-value was 1.33 for Cash/NA and it was not statistically 
significant, the t-value was 4.25 for Cash/TA and it was statistically significant at 1%.
We then divided, the managerial horizon variable, Age, into four quartiles and grouped 
the first quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f 
Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. The mean of the first quartile o f Age and the fourth 
quartile o f Age and the means o f the corresponding values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and 
Cash/TA was calculated. A differences o f means test (T -  test) between the means o f the 
first quartile o f Age and the fourth quartile o f Age was run. The results show that the t- 
value was 2.31 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically significant at 5%, the t-value was 
0.37 for Cash/NA and it was not statistically significant, the t-value was 0.87 for 
Cash/TA and it was not statistically significant.
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We divided another measure o f managerial horizon, MH3, into four quartiles and 
grouped the first quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding 
values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. The mean o f the first quartile o f MH3 and 
the fourth quartile o f MH3 and the means o f the corresponding values o f Cash/Sales, 
Cash/NA and Cash/TA was calculated. A differences of means test (T -  test) between the 
means o f the first quartile o f MH3 and the fourth quartile o f MH3 was run. The results 
show that the t-value was 5.66 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically significant at 1%, 
the t-value was 7.87 for Cash/NA and it was statistically significant at 1%, the t-value 
was 29.56 for Cash/TA and it was statistically significant at 1%. All the above results are 
shown in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The differences in medians test was then run for the first quartile o f tenure and fourth 
quartile of tenure and the corresponding values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. 
The results show that the z-value was -3.9949 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically 
significant at 1%, the z-value was -3.4194 for Cash/NA and it was statistically significant 
at 1%, the z-value was -4.3568 for Cash/TA and it was statistically significant at 1%.
The differences in medians test was then run for the first quartile o f Age and the fourth 
quartile o f Age and the corresponding values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. The 
results show that the z-value was -1.2848 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically not
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significant, the z-value was -2.8874 for Cash/NA and it was statistically significant at 
1%, the z-value was -1.0006 for Cash/TA and it was statistically not significant.
The differences in medians test was then run for the first quartile o f MH3 and the fourth 
quartile o f MH3 and the corresponding values o f Cash/Sales, Cash/NA and Cash/TA. The 
results show that the z-value was 31.1601 for Cash/Sales and it was statistically 
significant at 1% level, the z-value was 24.0390 for Cash/NA and it was statistically 
significant at 1%, the z-value was 31.8082 for Cash/TA and it was statistically significant 
at 1%. All the above results are shown in Table 3 A.
[Insert Table 3A here]
Then we used all the variables to run the main regression model to find the effect of 
managerial horizon (MH) on cash holding by firms. So the regression given by equation 
2 was run.
Cash/TA = Age + Tenure + MH3 + MH4 + Govindex + Sigma + MB + Sales + Realsize 
+ Cashflow/TA + NWC/TA + CAPX/TA + Leverage + R&D/Sales + Divdummy + 
Acquisition/TA + firm effect + year e ffec t.................................equation (2)
The results are exhibited in Table 4
[Insert Table 4 here]
We ran the regression a number o f times with various combinations o f the four proxies 
for managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4). Whenever the variable 
“governance” was used, the number o f available observations became very low, so the
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variable was omitted later on. The results show that Age always had a negative sign, 
which signifies that as Age increases cash holding decreases, which would imply that 
younger CEOs hold more cash than older CEOs. MH3 was always statistically significant 
at 1% level and always had a negative sign, which implies that as less o f the 
compensation is paid in cash the CEOs tend to hold more cash. MH4 was also always 
statistically significant at 1% and always had a positive sign, which implies that as higher 
proportion o f compensation is paid in the future, the CEOs tend to hold more cash.
We ran the same regression again but this time the dependent variable was Cash/Sales. 
The results are shown in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results show that the managerial horizon proxies were never statistically significant.
We ran the same regression again but this time the dependent variable was Cash/NA. The 
results are shown in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The results show that the managerial horizon proxies were never statistically significant. 
But at least the signs were consistent, Age had a negative sign, MH3 had a negative sign 
and MH4 always had a positive sign.
We ran the same regression again but this time the dependent variable was log(Cash/TA). 
The results are shown in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here]
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Age was statistically significant most o f the times and the sign was negative. MH3 was 
always statistically significant at 1% and the sign was always negative. MH4 was always 
statistically significant at 1 % and the sign was always positive.
We ran the same regression again but this time the dependent variable was log(Cash/NA). 
The results are shown in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Age was statistically significant few times and the sign was negative every time. Tenure 
was not statistically significant. MH3 was always statistically significant at 1% and the 
sign was always negative. MH4 was always statistically significant at 1% and the sign 
was always positive.
We ran the same regression again but this time the dependent variable was 
log(Cash/Sales). The results are shown in Table 9.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Age was not statistically significant but the sign was negative, and Tenure was never 
statistically significant. MH3 was always statistically significant at 1% level and the sign 
was always negative. MH4 was always statistically significant at 1% and the sign was 
always positive.
We ran all the above regressions again with M H(t-l) to avoid possible endogeneity 
problems between cash and managerial horizon.
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We ran the regression with Cash/TA as the dependent variable. The results are shown in 
Table 10.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Age(t-l) always had a negative sign. Tenure(t-l) was never statistically significant. 
M H3(t-l) was always statistically significant at 1% level and the sign was always 
negative. M H4(t-l) was always statistically significant and the sign was always positive.
We ran the regression again but this time with the dependent variable Cash/Sales. The 
results are shown in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 here]
Age(t-l) was never statistically significant but the sign was always negative. M H3(t-l) 
was always statistically significant at 1% level and the sign was always negative. MH4(t- 
1) was never statistically significant but the sign was always positive.
We ran the regression this time with the dependent variable Cash/NA. The results are 
shown in Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 here]
Age(t-l) was never statistically significant but the sign was always negative. Tenure(t-l) 
was never statistically significant. M H3(t-l) was never statistically significant but the 
sign was always negative. M H4(t-l) was never statistically significant but the sign was 
always positive.
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We ran the regression again but this time with the dependent variable log(Cash/TA). The 
results are shown in Table 13.
[Insert Table 13 here]
Age(t-l) was not statistically significant but the sign was always negative. Tenure(t-l) 
was never statistically significant. M H3(t-l) was always statistically significant at 1% 
level and the sign was always negative. MH4(t-l) was always statistically significant at 
1% level and the sign was always positive.
We ran the regression again but this time with the dependent variable log(Cash/NA). The 
results are shown in Table 14.
[Insert Table 14 here]
Age(t-l) was not statistically significant but always the sign was negative. Tenure(t-l) 
was never statistically significant. MH3(t-l) was always statistically significant at 1% 
level and the sign was always negative. M H4(t-l) was always statistically significant at 
1% level and the sign was always positive.
We ran the regression again but this time the dependent variable was log(Cash/Sales). 
The results are shown in Table 15.
[Insert Table 15 here]
Age(t-l) was not statistically significant but the sign was negative. Tenure(t-l) was never 
statistically significant. M H3(t-l) was always statistically significant at 1% level and the
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sign was always negative. M H4(t-l) was always statistically significant at 1% level and 
the sign was always positive.
Then the year fixed effect model regression was run six different times with the 
dependent variable being: a) Cash/TA, b) Cash/NA, c) Cash/Sales d) log(Cash/NA) e) 
log(Cash/TA) and f) log(Cash/Sales). The results are shown in Table 16.
[Insert Table 16 here]
Age is never statistically significant and has a negative sign with Cash/TA. Tenure is not 
statistically significant. MH3 is statistically significant at 1% level and has a negative 
sign for Cash/TA, log(Cash/Sales), log(Cash/TA) and log(Cash/NA). MH4 is statistically 
significant and has a positive sign for log(Cash/Sales), log(Cash/TA) and log(Cash/NA).
Then the firm fixed effect model regression was run six different times with the 
dependent variable being: a) Cash/TA, b) Cash/NA, c) Cash/Sales d) log(Cash/NA) e) 
log(Cash/TA) and f) log(Cash/Sales). The results are shown in Table 17.
[Insert Table 17 here]
MH3 is statistically significant at 1% level and has a negative sign for Cash/TA, 
log(Cash/Sales), log(Cash/TA) and log(Cash/NA). MH4 is statistically significant at 1% 




The results show that Age was statistically significant some of the time and Tenure was 
never statistically significant. MH3 was also statistically significant most o f the times and 
MH4 was statistically significant most o f the times. Age had a negative sign, which 
signifies that as Age increases cash holding decreases, which would imply that younger 
CEOs hold more cash than older CEOs. MH3 also had a negative sign, which implies that 
as less o f the compensation is paid in cash the CEOs tend to hold more cash. MH4 had a 
positive sign, which implies that as higher proportion o f compensation is paid in the 
future, the CEOs tend to hold more cash.
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B) THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL HORIZON ON FIRM VALUE 
DISCUSSION
This part o f the essay analyzes if managerial horizon has any impact on firm value. We 
constructed four different measures o f managerial horizon. The first two constructs (M H1 
and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO o f the 
company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, 
proportion o f current compensation and proportion of future compensation. We used the 
Opler, Pinkowitz et all (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt -  Smith (2007) papers to determine 
excess cash and show that firms holding excess cash see a reduction in firm value. Yung 
and Nafar (2014) using a sample o f international firms also find that excess cash has a 
significant negative impact on firm value.
The rest o f this paper is structured as follows, Section I describes the data, Section II 
explains the methodology, Section III presents the analysis and discusses the results, 
Section IV concludes the paper.
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I. DATA
The data about companies and cash holdings are collected from the Compustat database 
for the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). Data was collected for all publicly traded 
firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (non- ADRs). The sample excludes 
utilities (SIC Codes 4900 to 4949) because these firms are highly regulated, and as is 
generally prevalent, also excludes financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999). Data was 
collected from the Compustat database for all companies that were one time or the other 
listed on the NYSE, NASDAX or AMEX over the time 1993 -  2012. Therefore, the data 
includes both surviving and non-surviving firms that appeared on Compustat at any time 
during the sample period. Data was collected for 10,204 companies from the Compustat 
database.
The items for which data was collected and their explanations are listed in Appendix.
Data about CEO’s age and compensation was collected from the ExecuComp database 
over the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). The items for which data was collected from 
the ExecuComp database and their explanations are listed in Appendix.
Data about the variable “Governance” was collected from the corporate governance index 
as provided by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. It has data from 1994 -  2006 but not for all 
companies and not for all years.
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II. M ETHODOLOGY
The dependent variable o f the model is firm value and the independent variables o f 
interest are managerial horizon (MH) and excess cash. The rest o f the independent 
variables in the model are standard control variables used by Fama and French (1998). 
These variables reflect investors’ expectations o f future net cash flows, which determine 
the value o f the firm. The Fama and French (1998) control variables are: past changes, 
future changes and current levels o f Earnings, R&D expenses, dividends, interest 
expenses, as well as past and future changes in Assets and future changes in Market 
Value, all normalized by the Book Value of the Assets o f the firm. The regression 
equation is as follows:
MVi>t /NAi>t = a  + p,MHli,t + p2MH2i,t + p3Xcashi,t + p4(Xcashi,t* M H lix) + psGovindex.,, 
+ p6(Xcashj,t * Govindexj,,) + p7 MVj,t+2 /NAj,t + P« EamingSj,t /NAj,t + p9 D2EamingSj,t+2 
/NAj,t + Pio DL2EamingSi,(.2 /NAj,t + pn R&Dj,t /NA;,t + p ]2 D2R&Dj,t+2 /NAj,, + Pn 
DL2R&D, , /NAj,t + pi4 Interest, ! /NAj<t + Pis D2 Interest Kt+2 /NAj,, + Pi6 DL2Interestiit.2 
/NAj,, + p17 D2NAi,t+2 /NAi,t + p lg DL2NAi,,.2 /NAj,, + p)9 Dividends* /NAj., + p20 
D2Dividendsi,t+2 /NA* + p2i DL2Dividendsi,t-2 /NAj,t ........................... equation (3)
The explanation for all the items are listed in Appendix.
All the above data was collected, the only data that was missing was Xcash (excess cash). 
We derived the data for excess cash in two different methods and show the results
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obtained in both the cases. In the first method, we use the Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) paper to derive excess cash. We used the following regression equation as given 
by them; and used the residuals to compute excess cash:
Log(Cashi,t /NAj,t) = p0 + P,Log(NA,,t) + p2 (FCF,,t / NA,,t) + p3 (NWC* / NAj,,) + 
p4(Sigma)i,t + p5 (MVi t / NAj,,) + p6 (RDi>t / NAi>t) + e;,,.....................................Equation (4)
The explanation for all the items are listed in Appendix.
We used another variant o f the Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) paper where instead of 
Net Assets (NA), the Total Assets (AT) was used to derive excess cash and once the 
excess cash was calculated using AT, the original equation (1) was modified by replacing 
NA with AT. Results are shown for both using NA and AT.
Another method that we used to calculate excess cash was by following the Opler, 
Pinkowitz, et all (1999) paper. We used the following regression equation as given by 
them; and used the residuals to compute excess cash:
Cash/TA = MB + Sigma + Realsize + Cashflow/TA + NWC/TA + CAPX/TA + Leverage 
+ R&D/Sales + Divdummy + Acquisition/TA equation (5)
The explanation for all the items are listed in Appendix.
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III. RESULTS
The descriptive statistics revealed that since the matching o f the various data sets, there 
were lots of missing values and many variables, which had data, which were very far 
flung (outliers). Trying to winsorize all the variables at the top and bottom one 
percentiles (99 percentile and 1 percentile) provided a very low number o f observations. 
This is because the corporate governance index data set did not have too many 
observations to begin with. Therefore, instead o f winsorizing all the variables, we 
winsorized only a few variables that had lots of missing values and outliers. Therefore, 
the variables that were winsorized at 99 percentile and 1 percentile level were CFL, CEQ, 
IB, AT, MK.BK and DLC. This provided more than 50,000 observations to work with.
We ran the regression equation in the SAS program to calculate excess cash. Therefore, 
we ran the equation based on Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) as given in equation 4.
Log(Cashj,t /NAi,t) = p0 + P ^ o ^ N A ,.,)  + p2 (FCF,,t / NA U) + p3 (NW CU / N A iit) + 
p4(Sigma)i,t + p5 (M Vm / NAj,t) + p6 (RDj,, / NAj,,) + Sj.,.....................................Equation (4)
The results are shown in Table 18
[Insert Table 18 here]
The dependent variable is log(cash/NA) and the results show that all the independent 
variables are statistically significant. The residuals o f this regression equation were used 
to calculate excess cash (Cash minus optimal cash).
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We used Excess cash and all the other variables to run the main regression model to find 
the effect o f managerial horizon (MH) and excess cash on firm value. Therefore, we ran 
the following regression as given by equation 3.
MVi,t /NA,., -  a  + p,M Hl i<t + p2 MH2i,t + p3 Xcashj,t + p4  (Xcashiit* M H liit) + p5 Govindexi,t 
+ p6 (Xcashjit * GovindeXi,t) + P7 MVj>t+ 2  /NAjit + P« EamingSi,t /NAj,t + P9  D2 EamingSj, t + 2  
/NAj,t + P10 DL2 EamingSj,t . 2  /NAj,t + Pn R&Dj,t /NAj-t + p , 2  D2 R&Djt+ 2  /NAj,, + p 13 
DL2R&Di,t /NAi,t + P14 Interest;,t /NA;,t + P15 D2 Interesti i t+ 2  /NAi>t + p , 6  DL2 Interestj, t .2  
/NAj,t + P1 7 D2 NAj, t + 2  /NAj,t + Pi8 DL2 NAii t . 2  /NAj,t + Pi9  Dividendsi,t /NAj,t + P2 0  
D2 DividendSjj t+ 2  /NAj>t + P2 1 DL2 Dividendsi,t -2  /NAj,t ........................... equation (3)
The results are shown in Table 19
[Insert Table 19 here]
We ran the regression a number o f times with various combinations o f the four proxies 
for managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4). Whenever the variable 
“governance” was used, the number o f available observations became very small, so the 
variable was omitted later on. The results show that the managerial horizon proxies were 
never statistically significant, except one time when Age was statistically significant at 
10% level. Tenure, MH3 and MH4 were never statistically significant. The variable 
ExcessCash on the other hand was statistically significant at all times mostly at 1% level 
and once at 5% level.
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We ran the same equation again based on Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) to calculate 
excess cash but this time changed NA to TA (AT), so the dependent variable was 
log(Cash/TA). The results are shown in Table 20.
[Insert Table 20 here]
All the variables are statistically significant at 1% level except FCFTA. We used the 
residuals o f this regression equation to calculate excess cash.
We used Excess cash and all the other variables to run the main regression model to find 
the effect o f managerial horizon (MH) and excess cash on firm value. Therefore, we ran 
the regression given by equation 3 except that NA was changed to TA (AT), so the 
dependent variable was MVAT. The results are shown in Table 21.
[Insert Table 21 here]
We ran the regression a number o f times with various combinations o f the four proxies 
for managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4). Whenever the variable 
“governance” was used, the number o f available observations became very low, so the 
variable was omitted later on. The results show that Age and Tenure were never 
statistically significant. MH3 was statistically significant a few times at 1% level and 
MH4 was statistically significant a few times at 5% level. The variable ExcessCash on 
the other hand was statistically significant at all times either at 1% level 5% level or 10% 
level.
We ran the following regression equation to calculate excess cash. The equation is based 
on Opler et all (2006) as given in equation 5:
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Cash/TA = MB + Sigma + Realsize + Cashflow/TA + NWC/TA + CAPX/TA + Leverage 
+ R&D/Sales + Divdummy + Acquisition/TA................................................... equation (5)
The results are shown in Table 22.
[Insert Table 22 here]
All the variables are statistically significant. We used the residuals o f this regression 
equation to calculate excess cash.
We used Excess cash and all the other variables to run the main regression model to find 
the effect o f managerial horizon (MH) and excess cash on firm value. Therefore, we ran 
the regression given by equation 3 with the dependent variable MVNA.
The results are exhibited in Table 23
[Insert Table 23 here]
We ran the regression a number o f times with various combinations o f the four proxies 
for managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4). Whenever the variable 
“governance” was used, the number o f available observations became very low, so the 
variable was omitted later on. The results show that Age was always statistically 
significant at 1% level. Tenure and MH3 were sometimes statistically significant but 
MH4 was never statistically significant. The variable ExcessCash on the other hand was 
most often statistically significant at 1% level.
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We ran the regression equation to calculate excess cash. The equation is based on Opler 
et all (2006) as given in equation 3.
The results are shown in Table 24
[Insert Table 24 here]
All the variables are statistically significant. We used the residuals o f this regression 
equation to calculate excess cash.
We used Excess cash and all the other variables to run the main regression model to find 
the effect o f managerial horizon (MH) and excess cash on firm value. Therefore, we ran 
the regression given by equation 3 by changing all the NA’s to TA’s (AT). Therefore, the 
dependent variable for this regression equation was MVTA.
The results are shown in Table 25.
[Insert Table 25 here]
We ran the regression a number o f times with various combinations o f the four proxies 
for managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4). Whenever the variable 
“governance” was used, the number o f available observations became very low, so that 
variable was omitted later on. The results show that Age was seldom statistically 
significant. Tenure was always statistically significant at 1% level and MH3 was most 
often not statistically significant but MH4 was most often statistically significant. The 
variable ExcessCash on the other hand was most often statistically significant at 1% level 
and statistically insignificant a few times.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The first essay tries to determine the specific characteristics o f CEOs who would be more 
likely to hold on to excess cash. We used four different measures o f managerial horizon 
to determine if any specific characteristic o f CEO’s accumulate higher levels o f cash. The 
results clearly show that CEO Age and the proportion o f CEO’s compensation (current 
and future) do determine level o f cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more 
cash compared to older CEOs. CEOs who receive higher proportion o f their 
compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive 
higher proportion o f their compensation in current payments hold less cash. This makes 
intuitive sense because a CEO whose most o f the compensation is going to be paid in the 
future is more likely to conserve cash to better facilitate its future payments. This essay 
also shows that as companies are holding on to excess cash, the higher level o f excess 
cash is having a significant impact on the firm value. As expected, the results show that 
in general, firms holding more excess cash see a reduction in firm value.
This essay examines the influences o f managerial horizon on cash holdings and it also 
raises many interesting opportunities for future research as well. The effect o f managerial 
horizon on corporate policies such as debt and equity issuance, share repurchase, 
dividends, and investments remains to be examined. In future research, it would be 
interesting to explore the correlation between managerial horizon and aforementioned 
corporate policies.
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ESSAY 2: MANAGERIAL HORIZON AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION
One important way to measure, a firm’s performance is to study its Earnings. There is a 
risk that managers might manipulate earnings to dress up a firm’s performance to 
increase investor demand for stock. There are many studies, which have examined the 
opportunistic uses o f accounting information around various types o f corporate events. 
To examine earnings management most researchers study accruals. Accruals are 
accounting adjustments to a firm’s cash flows from operations that convert cash flows 
into accounting earnings. Earnings quality is often interpreted as synonymous with 
accruals quality. In this essay, we try to examine if Managerial horizon has any impact on 
Earnings Management. There is a whole host o f literature regarding Earnings 
management, accruals quality and manipulation o f earnings around various corporate 
events, but to our knowledge there is no study, which has examined if  managerial horizon 
(using proxies for both age and compensation) has any effect on earnings management.
This essay examines if  managerial horizon has any effect on earnings management. We 
constructed four different measures o f managerial horizon. The first two constructs (MH 1 
and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age (AGE) and how long he has been the CEO of the 
company (Tenure). The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, 
proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. The results 
show no effect o f managerial horizon (MH) on earnings management (EM). The results 
show that EM is caused by the Agency problem in the firms and free cash flows causes
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EM. We also tried to find out what managers do with EM, tried to determine if EM is 
used for higher dividend payouts. The results show that EM does not lead to higher 
dividend payouts.
The rest o f this paper is structured as follows: Section I provides the background and 
literature review of the topic, Section II describes the data, Section III explains the 
methodology, Section IV presents the analysis and discusses the results, Section V 
concludes the paper.
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I. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW:
Earnings management is often defined by the following definition as stated by Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999:
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance o f the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”
Earnings management is recognized as attempts by management to influence or 
manipulate reported earnings by using specific accounting methods (or changing 
methods), recognizing one-time non-recurring items, deferring or accelerating expense or 
revenue transactions, or using other methods designed to influence short-term earnings 
(Akers et al., 2007)
Earnings quality is a measure o f the ability o f reported earnings to reflect the firm’s true 
earnings and to help predict future earnings.
Earnings management is predominantly a function o f manipulating accruals, so it is 
intuitive to use the magnitude o f accruals as a proxy for earnings quality: the higher the 
total accruals as a percentage o f assets, the greater the likelihood that earnings quality is 
low. Remember that accruals can be either a reflection o f earnings manipulation or just
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normal accounting estimations based on future business expectations. It is difficult to 
determine which one is driving the accruals, but there is evidence that the size o f accruals 
can be used as a rough measure for earnings manipulation, especially in high-accrual 
firms.
Accruals are amounts unaccounted for yet still owing at the period or year-end. If the 
amount is not known, estimates need to be made and then added to the expenses in order 
for this to show a true picture in the Profit and Loss account.
There is a large body o f literature regarding earnings management. The primary focus o f 
earnings management research has been on detecting whether and when earnings 
management takes place. Healy and Wahlen (1999) have reviewed earnings management 
literature in respect to the usefulness o f prior research for standard setters. Recently, 
Verbruggen, Christaens and Mills (2008) have done a comprehensive review on earnings 
management research.
Several studies have examined various motives for earnings management. Many studies 
have examined if firms manage earnings for stock market purposes. These include studies 
o f earnings management in periods surrounding capital market transactions and when 
there is a gap between firm performance and analysts’ or investors’ expectations. Some 
studies indicate that firms report positive (income increasing) unexpected accruals prior
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to seasoned equity offers (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998 and Shivakumar, 2000), initial 
public offers (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998 and DuCharme et al., 2001), and stock 
financed acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 1998).
Meeting or beating the analysts’ forecasts seems to be o f enough importance for 
companies to engage in earnings management. Burgstahler and Eames (1998) find that 
firms manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. Missing an earnings benchmark has 
negative implications for stock returns as well as CEO compensation (Matsunaga and 
Park, 2001).
There is also a vast list o f literature regarding earnings management and CEOs (the topic 
that this paper is most closely associated with). Two articles present evidence o f earnings 
management when there is a change in CEO (Godfrey et al., 2003) or when the CEO is 
retiring (Reitenga and Teamy, 2003). A new CEO can be inclined to lower earnings 
management in the year o f change and increase earnings management in the following 
years. Retiring CEO’s use higher earnings management to leave in style and keep a seat 
on the board. However, some studies find little or no association between managerial 
retirement and earnings management (Cheng, 2004). Kalyta (2009) finds evidence o f 
income-increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when CEO 
compensation is based on firm performance.
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Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have analyzed relationships between 
managerial compensation and earnings management. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
argue that managers manipulate earnings in order to increase the amount o f their bonus 
compensation. Healy (1985) shows that firms with caps on bonus awards are more likely 
to report accruals that defer income when that cap is reached than firms that have 
comparable performance but which have no bonus cap. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) 
find that with large stock options, in the pre-exercise period discretionary accruals are 
abnormally high, while in the post-exercise period discretionary accruals are abnormally 
low.
A number o f studies examine the relationship between managerial horizon and earnings 
management. Theoretically speaking, a manager who plans to leave the firm lacks 
incentives to act in the best interest o f the firm. Managers with short horizon prefer 
projects with lower net present value but higher current earnings to projects with higher 
net present values but lower current earnings (Smith and Watts, 1982). Gibbons and 
Murphy (1992) hypothesize that these activities would be especially pronounced when 
the manager intends to retire rather than join another firm, because a retiring manager 
faces fewer reputational concerns. However, despite theoretical predictions, empirical 
evidence on the impact o f managerial horizon on earnings management is scarce and 
inconclusive. Wells (2002) finds little empirical evidence of income-increasing earnings 
management prior to CEO departures.
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Empirical findings on the association between managerial horizon and earnings 
management decisions are also mixed. Dechow and Sloan (1991) show that CEOs in 
their final years in office reduced R&D spending, presumably to increase reported 
earnings. This behavior is consistent with the short-term nature o f their compensation 
contracts and their short employment horizons. However, Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993) find little support for the impact o f the horizon problem on R&D expenditures. 
Cheng (2004) finds no association between CEO turnover and R&D expenditures.
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II. DATA
Data about companies and cash holdings are collected from the Compustat database over 
the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). Data is collected for all publicly traded firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (non- ADRs). The sample excludes utilities 
(SIC Codes 4900 to 4949) because these firms are highly regulated, and as is generally 
prevalent, excludes financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999). Data was collected from 
the Compustat database for all companies that were one time or the other listed on the 
NYSE, NASDAX or AMEX over the time 1993 -  2012. Therefore, the data includes 
both surviving and non-surviving firms that appeared on Compustat at any time during 
the sample period. Data was collected for 10,204 companies from the Compustat 
database.
The items for which data was collected and their explanations are listed in Appendix.
Data about CEO’s age and compensation was collected from the ExecuComp database 
over the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). The items for which data was collected from 
the ExecuComp database and their explanations are listed in Appendix.
Data about the variable “Governance” was collected from the corporate governance index 
as provided by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. It has data from 1994 -  2006 but not for all 
companies and not for all years.
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III. M ETHODOLOGY
We measure Earnings management by following the work o f Lee and Masulis (2009). 
They have measured accruals quality by following the Jones model (1991). They have 
improved the measurement o f accounting quality by using the residuals from the model 
used by Dechow and Dichev (2002). They have also taken into account the modification 
by McNichols (2002).
Therefore, the resulting regression equation that we used is given as follows:
CAjit= Cj + d>iCFOj,t-i + d^CFOj.t + OjCFOjt+i + d^ASalesj.t + OsPPEj,t + Vj,t (6)
The explanation o f all the variables are listed in Appendix.
We ran the regression for equation (6) by using SIC Codes for all companies and 
breaking them up into 48 industry groups as done by Fama and French (1997). We used 
the residual of the regression as the measure o f Earnings Management (EM).
We examined previous literature to design the model and control variables. Based on 
previous literature the model looks like:
EM = MH (various proxies) + Sales + ROA + Leverage + Firmsize + CEO cash 
compensation + CEO non-cash compensation + firm effect + year e ffec t.. ..eqn(7)
The explanation o f all the variables are listed in Appendix.
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IV. RESULTS
We ran the means program to get the descriptive statistics, which is shown, in table 26.
[Insert Table 26 here]
The descriptive statistics revealed that since the matching o f the various data sets, there 
were lots o f missing values and many variables, which had data, which were very far 
flung (outliers). When all the variables were winsorized at the top and bottom one 
percentiles (99 percentile and 1 percentile), the resultant final data with all available 
variables had very few observations. This is because the corporate governance index data 
set did not have too many observations to begin with. So we winsorized only, a few 
variables, which had lots o f missing values and outliers. Therefore, the variables that we 
winsorized at 99 percentile and 1 percentile level were CFL, CEQ, IB, AT, MKBK and 
DLC. This still left more than 50,000 observations to work with.
We ran the correlation program and obtained the correlation matrix for the entire data set. 
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 27.
[Insert Table 27 here]
We ran the regression as given in equation 6:
CAjt— Cj + <I>iCFOj,t-i + d>2 CFOj,t + C^CFOj^t+i + <J>4 ASalesj,t + OsPPE^t + vj,t (6)
We first formatted the equation based on the long format o f SIC Codes as given by Fama 
and French (1997) and sorted the data based on 48 industry groups. We ran the regression
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and used the residual o f the regression result as the Earnings Management measurement 
(EM).
We divided one o f the measures o f managerial horizon, Tenure, into four quartiles and 
grouped the first quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding 
values o f EM. We calculated the mean of the first quartile of Tenure and the fourth 
quartile o f tenure and the means o f the corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences 
o f means test (T -  test) between the means o f the first quartile o f Tenure and the fourth 
quartile o f tenure. The result showed that the t-value was 1.26 and it was not statistically 
significant.
We divided the variable, Age, into four quartiles and grouped the first quartile and the 
fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We calculated the mean 
of the first quartile o f Age and the fourth quartile o f Age and the means o f the 
corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  test) between the 
means o f the first quartile o f Age and the fourth quartile o f Age. The result showed that 
the t-value was -0.87 and it was not statistically significant.
We divided the variable, MH3, into four quartiles and grouped the first quartile and the 
fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We calculated the mean 
o f the first quartile o f MH3 and the fourth quartile o f MH3 and the means o f the
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corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  test) between the 
means o f the first quartile o f MH3 and the fourth quartile o f MH3. The result showed that 
the t-value was 0.23 and it was not statistically significant. All the above results are 
shown in Table 28.
[Insert Table 28 here]
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f tenure and fourth quartile o f 
tenure and the corresponding values o f EM. The result showed that the z-value was - 
2.1893 and it was statistically significant at 5% level.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f Age and the fourth quartile 
o f Age and the corresponding values of EM. The result showed that the z-value was 
2.8422 and it was statistically significant at 1% level.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f MH3 and the fourth quartile 
o f MH3 and the corresponding values o f EM. The result showed that the z-value was 
4.7754 and it was statistically significant at the 1% level. All the above results are shown 
in Table 28A.
[Insert Table 28A here]
Then we ran the regression equation with EM being the dependent variable:
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EM = MH (various proxies) + Sales + ROA + Leverage + Realsize + CEO cash 
compensation + CEO non-cash compensation + firm effect + year effect.. ..eqn(7)
Table 29 shows the results with EM being the dependent variable and various 
combinations o f MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4).
[Insert Table 29 here]
As the results exhibit, Age is not statistically significant in any of the equations. Tenure, 
MH3 and MH4 are also not statistically significant in any o f the equations. Therefore, in 
all the equations none o f the measures o f Managerial horizon (Age, Tenure, MH3 and 
MH4) is ever statistically significant.
Then we ran the year fixed effect model with EM being the dependent variable.
Table 30 shows the results with EM being the dependent variable and all the proxies of 
MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4).
[Insert Table 30 here]
The results show that Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4 are not statistically significant.
Then we ran the firm fixed effect model with EM being the dependent variable.
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Table 31 shows the results with EM being the dependent variable and all the proxies of 
MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4).
[Insert Table 31 here]
The results show that Age is statistically significant at 5% level and MH3 is statistically 
significant at 10% level but Tenure and MH4 are not statistically significant.
Therefore, the results show that the various proxies o f managerial horizon were not 
causing earnings management in the firms. We tried to find various other factors that 
could be determining EM. We ran various differences o f means chow tests to find various 
determinants o f EM. EM could be caused by differences in growth opportunities in firms 
as shown by their market-to-book ratio or even by larger firms as shown by their total 
assets or by firms, which have higher cash or free cash flow.
We divided Market to Book ratio (MKBK) into four quartiles and grouped the first 
quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We 
calculated the mean o f the first quartile o f MKBK and the fourth quartile o f MKBK and 
the means o f the corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  
test) between the means o f the first quartile o f MKBK and the fourth quartile o f MKBK. 
The result showed that the t-value was -0.19 and it was not statistically significant.
We divided the variable, Cash (CHE), into four quartiles and grouped the first quartile 
and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We calculated
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the mean of the first quartile o f CHE and the fourth quartile o f CHE and the means of the 
corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  test) between the 
means o f the first quartile o f CHE and the fourth quartile o f CHE. The result showed that 
the t - value was -1.42 and it was not statistically significant.
We divided the variable, Total Assets (AT), into four quartiles and grouped the first 
quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We 
calculated the mean of the first quartile of AT and the fourth quartile o f AT and the 
means o f the corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  test) 
between the means of the first quartile o f AT and the fourth quartile o f AT. The results 
showed that the t-value was -0.48 and it was not statistically significant.
We divided the variable, Cash Flow (CFL), into four quartiles and grouped the first 
quartile and the fourth quartile separately with their corresponding values o f EM. We 
calculated the mean o f the first quartile o f CFL and the fourth quartile o f CFL and the 
means o f the corresponding values o f EM. We ran a differences o f means test (T -  test) 
between the means o f the first quartile o f CFL and the fourth quartile o f CFL. The results 
showed that the t-value was -3.06 and it was statistically significant at 1% level. All the 
above results are shown in Table 32.
[Insert Table 32 here]
47
Therefore, the results show that EM is not determined by growth opportunities or size o f 
the firm, but EM is determined by the amount o f free cash flow in the firm. This leads to 
the acceptance o f the Agency theory o f firms regarding EM.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f MKBK and fourth quartile 
o f MKBK and the corresponding values o f EM. The results showed that the z-value was - 
1.9661 and it was statistically significant at 5% level.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f CHE and the fourth quartile 
o f CHE and the corresponding values o f EM. The results showed that the z-value was - 
2.7875 and it was statistically significant at 1% level.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f AT and the fourth quartile 
o f AT and the corresponding values o f EM. The results showed that the z-value was - 
1.3268 and it was statistically significant at the 10% level.
We ran the differences in medians test for the first quartile o f CFL and the fourth quartile 
o f CFL and the corresponding values o f EM. The results showed that the z-value was - 
21.5803 and it was statistically significant at the 1% level. All the above results are 
shown in Table 32A.
[Insert Table 32A here]
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Then we tried to find out what managers do with Earnings management (EM). We tried 
to determine if  managers are using EM to make higher dividend payouts. Therefore, we 
ran the following regression equation:
Dividend payout = MH (various proxies) + EM + EM*MH + M/B + ROA + OIBDP/TA 
+ Cash/TA + Leverage + Realsize + CEO cash compensation + CEO non-cash 
compensation + firm effect + year effect.. ..eqn(8)
The explanation for all the terms are given in Appendix.
Table 33 shows the results with Dividend payout being the dependent variable and 
various combinations o f MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4) and EM.
[Insert Table 33 here]
As the results exhibit, Age is not statistically significant in any o f the equations. Tenure 
and MH4 are also not statistically significant in any o f the equations. Therefore, in all the 
equations MH3 is the only measure o f Managerial horizon that is ever statistically 
significant. EM is also not statistically significant in any o f the equations. EM*MH 
(various proxies) is also never statistically significant in any o f the equations. Therefore, 
it can be seen that EM is not leading to higher dividend payouts.
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Then we ran the year fixed effect model with Dividend payout being the dependent 
variable.
Table 34 shows the results with Dividend payout being the dependent variable and all the 
proxies o f MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4) and EM.
[Insert Table 34 here]
The results show that Age, Tenure and MH4 are not statistically significant. EM is also 
not
statistically significant, and EM*MH (various proxies) are also not statistically 
significant.
Then we ran the firm fixed effect model with Dividend payout being the dependent 
variable.
Table 35 shows the results with Dividend payout being the dependent variable and all the 
proxies o f MH (Age, Tenure, MH3 and MH4) and EM.
[Insert Table 35 here]
The results show that Age and MH3 are statistically significant at 1% level and Tenure is 
statistically significant at 10% level but MH4 is not statistically significant. EM is also 
not statistically significant, EM*MH (various proxies) are also not statistically 




In these two essays, we used four different measures o f managerial horizon, two 
measures related to age and tenure o f the CEO and two measures related to the 
compensation to analyze their effect on cash holding. The results clearly show that CEO 
Age and the proportion o f CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level 
o f cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. 
Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated 
by the idea o f leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their 
compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive 
more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash. This makes intuitive 
sense because a CEO whose most o f the compensation is going to be paid in the future is 
more likely to conserve cash to better facilitate its future payments. These essays also 
show that as companies are holding on to excess cash, the higher level o f excess cash is 
having a significant impact on the firm value. As expected, the results show that in 
general firms holding more excess cash see a reduction in firm value.
In the second essay, we examine if Earnings Management (EM) is caused by changes in 
managerial horizon. Earnings are one o f the most important measures o f firm 
performance. It is also a fact that managers have a tendency to manipulate earnings to 
raise investor demand for a stock. As many researchers have previously pointed out 
earnings manipulation takes place quite often. We use a very good measurement o f EM
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as propounded by Lee and Masulis (2009) but the results do not show any effect of 
managerial horizon on Earnings management. We also tried various chow tests to find the 
various determinants o f EM. The results show that EM is caused by the Agency problem 
in the firms and free cash flows causes EM. We also tried to find out what managers do 
with EM, tried to determine if EM is used for higher dividend payouts. The results show 
that EM does not lead to higher dividend payouts.
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APPENDIX
Data was collected from Compustat for 10,204 companies over the time 1993 -  2012 (20- 
year period). The items for which data was collected are listed below:
CHE: Cash & Short Term Investment
AT: Assets-Total
PRCCF: Price-Close Fiscal Year









DVPSX: Div per Share-Exdate
AQC: Acquisitions
MKBK: Price to Book





IB: Income Bef Extra Items
ROA: Return on Assets
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DP: Depreciation-Amortization 
PPEGT: PP&E-Total Gross 
PPENT: PP&E-Total Net 




Data was collected from ExecuComp database for the time 1993 -  2012 (20-year period). 
The items for which data was collected are listed below:
Age: Age of the CEO
Year became CEO
Salary: The dollar value of the base salary earned by the CEO during the fiscal year
Stock unvested value: The aggregate market value o f restricted shares held by the 
executive as o f fiscal year end.
TDC1: Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grant + 
LTIP Payouts + All other + Value o f Option Grants)




MB = Price to Book = MKBK
Realsize = Ln(AT) expressed in 2004 dollars.
Sigma is the measure o f the volatility o f a firm’s cash flow over the time period. It is the 
mean of the standard deviation o f the cash flow over assets.
Leverage: (DLTT + DLC) / AT
R&D = XRD
Divdummy = 0 when firm does not pay any dividend and is 1 when it pays a dividend 
Acquisition = AQC 
MH1: Age o f the CEO 
MH2: CEO’s tenure.
CEO’s tenure (MH2) is calculated by using the definition used by Karuna (2009)
Tenure = ln( 1 + years as CEO)
Years as CEO = difference between current year and the year became CEO.
MH3: Salary /TDC1
Proportion o f salary to total CEO compensation as defined by Sharma and Hsieh (2011). 
MH4: S tockunvestedvalue / TDC1 
DL2 X t - 2 is the change in X from time t-2 to t
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DX t + 2  is the change in X from time t to t+2
MVj,t = Market Value at time t = (PRCCF*CSHO) + LT
NAjft = Assets net o f cash at time t = AT - CHE
Xcashj,t = Cash at time t minus optimal cash
Govindexi t = Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index at time t
FCF = Operating Income minus interest minus taxes = OIBDP -  XINT -  TXT
NWC = Current Assets -  Current Liabilities -  Cash = ACT -  LCT -  CHE
NA = Net Assets = AT -  CHE
Cash = CHE
MV = (Price * Shares) + Total Liabilities = (PRCCF * CSHO) + LT 
RD -  R&D Expenditures.
Where CA = total current accruals = A current assets (ACT) -  A current liabilities (LCT) 
-  A cash (CHE) + A debt in current liabilities (DLC)
A = changes from year t to t -  1
CFO = cash flow from operations = net income before extraordinary items (IB) -  total 
accruals
Total accruals = current accruals (CA) -  depreciation and amortization expense (DP) 
Sales = SALE
PPE = property, plant and equipment (PPEGT)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Dev Mtatiianm Maximum
Lower
QnartOc
AQC 20.47042 61.14561 -l 506 0 0 6.1 45829
AT 223.9929 225.3666 0.9 941 49 145 323 45829
Age 53.54244 12.96218 0 96 50 55 60 12971
CFL 60.15491 123.457 -67 783 0.5 11 62 45829
CHE 62.71457 115.5261 0.1 111 3.3 15 64 45829
CSHO 55.26925 109.548 0 998 7.6 19 52 45201
DLC 29.91102 76.72724 0.1 633 1.1 4.2 16 45829
DLTT 117.9599 184.8253 0.1 883 3.2 23 157 45829
DVPSX 0.338884 5.421875 0 705 0 0 0 43080
PRCCF 19.12503 41.45656 0 998 4.6 10 22 38770
SALE 219.504 224.6385 0.1 940 43 141 317 45829
Tenure 1.745384 0.888025 0 4.1271344 1.098612 1.79176 2.397895 11638
WCAP 93.60607 149.466 -62 826 5.1 31 119 45829
XINT 27.14584 76.84073 -6 982 0.8 4 18 43553
XRD 27.70131 82.18813 0 991 0.5 4.7 19 27122
MH3 0.321208 0.230632 0 1 0.152843 0.255405 0.428299 12872













^ 3 ^ 3 8 ^
<.0001
45829





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: T -  tests for the differences in means
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.




















0.6711 0.5610 1.2726 1.0107 0.5912 0.5009
0 - 1 . 1 2 .4 8 -
4.13
t Value 1.89’ t Value 1.33 t Value 4.25




















0.6806 0.5344 1.0404 0.9939 0.5231 0.5058
0 - 5 0 6 1 - 9 6 t Value 2.31" t Value 0.37 t Value 0.87




















0.9252 0.4694 2.1451 0.5964 0.9095 0.2788
0 -
0.153
0.429 -  1 t Value 5 .66"’ t Value 7.87’’’ t Value 29.56*”
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Table 3A: Differences in medians
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.





0 - 1 . 1 2 .4 8 -
4.13
Z Value -3.9949"’ Z Value -3.4194"’ Z Value -4.3568***





0 - 5 0 2 .4 8 -
4.13
Z Value -1.2848 Z Value -2.8874*** Z Value -1.0006







0.429 -  1
jIc 4c
Z Value 31.1601 Z Value 24.0390*** Z Value 31.8082***
72
Table 4: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/TA 
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 0.91940*** 0.45126**’ 0.36700*** 0.26806*** 0.26992*** 0.35733"*




Tenure 0.03008 0.01729* 0.01166
(0.56) (1.71) ( 1 .2 2 )
MB 0.00021781 0.00345*** 0.00361*** 0.00373*** 0.00373*** 0.00349***
(0.13) (10.13) (10.97) (11.32) (11.32) (10.26)
Sigma 0.17384** 0.27862*** 0.27429*** 0.28729*** 0.28731*** 0.27900*’*
(2.27) (16.81) (17.47) (18.39) (18.38) (16.84)
NWCoverTA -0.22510*** -0.18052*** -0.17828*** -0.18141*** -0.18140*** -0.18079***
(-7.79) (-30.46) (-32.03) (-32.60) (-32.60) (-30.49)
CAPXoverTA 0.13055 0.06555*** 0.07046*** 0.07091*** 0.07090*** 0.06403***
(1.62) (4.70) (5.34) (5.36) (5.36) (4.59)
RDoverSales 0.12591** 0.04316*** 0.04617*** 0.04807*** 0.04807*** 0.04364***
(2.13) (5.98) (6.57) (6.83) (6.83) (6.04)
Divdummy -0.24853*** -0.22477*** -0.22247*** -0.22544*** -0.22535*** -0.22785***
(-2 .6 8 ) (-12.77) (-13.72) (-13.85) (-13.78) (-13.15)
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AQCoverTA 0.05580 0.03889** 0.03379* 0.04161** 0.04161** 0.04015***
(0.64) (1.99) (1.83) (2.25) (2.25) (2.05)
Leverage 0.12810*** 0.10397*** 0 . 1 0 0 2 0 *** 0 . 1 0 1 2 0 *** 0 . 1 0 1 2 2 *’* 0.10358***
(3.73) (14.49) (14.79) (14.90) (14.89) (14.44)
Realsize -0.00000175 -0.00000128* -0.00000116* -9.45303E-7 -9.4572 IE-7 -0.00000109
(-0.55) (-1.75) (-1.67) (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.50)
MH3 -0.09081 -0.27055*** -0.26061*’* -0.27374***
(-0.41) (-6.65) (-7.08) (-6.75)
MH4 0.03581 0.02051*** 0.01833** 0.01834"
(0.56) (2.73) (2.52) (2.52)
Governance -0.00975
(-0.56)
Observations 360 6620 7340 7340 7340 6620
R1 0.3837 0.3963 0.3968 0.3932 0.3932 0.3954
Adj R 2 0.3568 0.3951 0.3959 0.3923 0.3922 0.3943
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Table 5: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/Sales 
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 0.46016 0.07292 0.27900*** 0.25523*** 0.23203’**
(1.27) (0.52) (6.08) (9.61) (4.33)
Age 0.00031193 0.00331
(0.05) (1.23)
Tenure 0.06534 -0.02598 -0.01323 -0.01701
(1.28) (-1.19) (-0.65) (-0.82)
MB 0.00064863 0.00022123 0.00011681 -0.00033666 0.00018133
(0.41) (0.30) (0.16) (-0.47) (0.25)
Sigma 0.12693* 0.12223*** 0.11520*** 0.11731*** 0.12393***
(1.74) (3.39) (3.24) (3.49) (3.45)
NWCoverTA -0.19901*** -0.10931*** -0.10695*** -0.10720*** -0.10930***
(-7.24) (-8.49) (-8.36) (-8.95) (-8.49)
CAPXoverTA 0.07658 -0.23504*** -0.23401**’ -0.20903*** -0.23449***
( 1 .0 0 ) (-7.76) (-7.75) (-7.34) (-7.75)
RDoverSales 0.46641*** 1.95290*** 1.95024*’* 1.92395*** 1.95245***
(8.30) (124.51) (124.73) (126.97) (124.53)
Divdummy -0.23118*** -0.11571*** -0.10403*” -0.10711*** -0.10752***
(-2.62) (-3.03) (-2.78) (-3.06) (-2 .8 6 )
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AQCoverTA -0.12655 -0.18194*** -0.18945*** -0.19565*** -0.18243***
(-1.53) (-4.28) (-4.50) (-4.92) (-4.29)
Leverage 0.05984* 0.03833** 0.03845** 0.03357** 0.03927**
(1.83) (2.46) (2.48) (2.30) (2.52)
Realsize -0.00000762** -0.00002316*** -0.00002328*** -0.00002249*** -0.00002308***
(-2.53) (-14.58) (-14.86) (-14.99) (-14.65)
MH3 -0.40111* 0.14477 0.15458
(-1.92) (1.64) (1.76)




Observations 360 6620 6654 7340 6620
"'r 2'..................... 0.4254 0.7079 0.7073 0.6946 0.7079
Adj R 2 0.4003 0.7073 0.7068 0.6941 0.7073
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Table 6 : Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/NA 
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.50569 0.83513** 0.47886** 0.78077 0.49636
(-0.15) (2.42) (2.07) (1.59) (1.17)
Age -0.02084
(-0.36)
Tenure 0.40092 0.02583 0.00591
(0.80) (0.14) (0.03)
MB 0.14591 0.05173*** 0.05226*** 0.05487*** 0.05530***
(6.75)*** (4.64) (4.69) (4.57) (4.61)
Sigma -2.52863** 0.03734 0.11307 0.13982 0.20634
(-2 . 1 2 ) (0.08) (0.24) (0.27) (0.40)
NWCoverTA -0.44922 -0.53767*** -0.54799*** -0.50998*** -0.51936***
(-1.34) (-3.74) (-3.82) (-3.15) (-3.22)
CAPXoverTA 6.71903*** 0.66307 0.66642 0.65671 0.66065
(5.97) (1.61) (1.62) (1.46) (1.47)
RDoverSales 0.45993 0.14593 0.15222 0.13939 0.14436
(0.47) ( 1 . 1 1 ) (1.16) ( 1 .0 0 ) (1.04)
Divdummy 0.72446 -0.23490 -0.25302 -0.27733 -0.29719
(0 .8 6 ) (-0.73) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.83)
77
AQCoverTA 0.46245 -0.12896 -0.09558 -0.08926 -0.05832
(0.47) (-0.29) (-0 .2 2 ) (-0.18) (-0 . 1 2 )
Leverage -0.40401 0.32816** 0.32494** 0.29759* 0.29445*
(-1.18) (2.09) (2.06) (1.71) (1.70)
Realsize -0.00012881*** -0.00001429 -0.00001290 -0.00001425 -0.00001333
(-3.02) (-0.80) (-0.72) (-0.75) (-0.70)
MH3 1.34115 -0.92077 -0.82733
(0.72) (-1.32) (-1.04)




Observations 278 6054 6054 5402 5402
R2 0.5074 0.0170 0.0168 0.0165 0.0163
Adj R2 0.4791 0.0152 0.0150 0.0143 0.0141
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Table 7: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/TA)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.36306 -2.20548*** -1.76511*** -2.22254*** -1.73081*** -2.14073
(-0.63) (-32.71) (-48.59) (-88.46) (-35.54) (-50.02)
Age -0.02324** -0.00002168
(-2.40) (-0.02)
Tenure 0.07823 0.00059662 -0.03261*
(0.97) (0.03) (-1.72)
MB 0.00005084 0.00480*** 0.00414*** 0.00471*** 0.00398*** 0.00454***
(0.02) (7.13) (6.27) (7.02) (5.93) (6.66)
Sigma 0.35055*** 0.59398*** 0.53090*** 0.59252*** 0.53263*** 0.59670***
(3.04) (18.64) (16.84) (18.63) (16.30) (18.12)
NWCoverTA -0.23715*** -0.24362*** -0.22747*** -0.24226*** -0.22268*** -0.23825**’
(-5.46) (-21.54) (-20.35) (-21.39) (-19.04) (-20.12)
CAPXoverTA 0.25964** 0.07579*** 0.07719*** 0.07839*** 0.06849** 0.07119**
(2.14) (2.81) (2.91) (2.91) (2.49) (2.55)
RDoverSales 0.20562** 0.13795 0.12767*** 0.13671*** 0.11941*** 0.12759***
(2.31) (9.60) *** (9.05) (9.54) (8.38) (8.82)
Divdummy -0.43210*** -0.45302*“ -0.44522*** -0.45728*** -0.45796*** -0.47658***
(-3.09) (-13.62) (-13.67) (-13.80) (-13.40) (-13.71)
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AQCoverTA 0.10461 0.06210* 0.02352 0.06069 0.04886 0.08777**
(0.80) (1.66) (0.63) (1.61) (1.26) (2.24)
Leverage 0.21845*** 0.23354*** 0.22733*** 0.23224*** 0.23078*** 0.23472***
(4.23) (16.87) (16.71) (16.79) (16.31) (16.32)
Realsize 0.00000176 0.00000648*** 0.00000451*** 0.00000568*** 0.00000439*
* *
0.00000539***
(0.37) (4.59) (3.24) (4.01) (3.07) (3.69)
MH3 -1.19024*** -1.21547*** -1.25995***
(-3.61) (-16.45) (-15.76)




Observations 360 7384 7340 7340 6620 6620
R2 0.4428 0.3335 0.3580 0.3362 0.3606 0.3391
Adj R2 0.4185 0.3325 0.3570 0.3352 0.3594 0.3379
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Table 8: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/NA)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.22580 -1.68172*** -2.13935*** -1.64001*** -2.08248*** -1.62203***
(-0.26) (-34.78) (-65.42) (-17.34) (-23.46) (-24.64)




MB 0.00544 0.01204*** 0.01275*** 0.01202*** 0.01272*** 0.01190***
(1.00) (7.72) (8.09) (7.71) (8.07) (7.41)
Sigma 0.26437 0.59613*** 0.69494*** 0.59757*** 0.69680*** 0.61789***
(0.88) (8.91) (10.34) (8.92) (10.36) (8.84)
NWCoverTA -0.22782” * -0.25735*** -0.27092*** -0.25702*** -0.27046*** -0.25376***
(-2.69) (-12.81) (-13.35) (-12.78) (-13.32) (-11.74)
CAPXoverT
A
0.62874** 0.09091 0.09462 0.09035 0.09388 0.06167
(2.22) (1.58) (1.62) (1.57) (1.61) (1.02)
RDoverSales 0.54217** 0.16018*** 0.16824*** 0.16014*’* 0.16819*** 0.15028***
(2.20) (8.71) (9.05) (8.71) (9.05) (8.10)
Divdummy -0.22567 -0.51626*** -0.53906*** -0.51426*** -0.53634*** -0.54462***
(-1.07) (-11.45) (-11.82) (-11.36) (-11.71) (-11.38)
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AQCoverTA 0.15058 -0.02476 0.01896 -0.02445 0.01934 0.03861
(0.60) (-0.40) (0.31) (-0.40) (0.31) (0.60)
Leverage 0.16840* 0.24637*** 0.24232*** 0.24648*** 0.24246*** 0.24835***











(0.68) (4.57) (5.28) (4.57) (5.28) (4.29)
MH3 -1.09943** -1.18979'" -1.18926'" -1.23052"’
(-2.34) (-12.22) (-12.21) (-11.61)




Observations 278 6054 6054 6054 6054 5402
R2 0.3304 0.2426 0.2249 0.2426 0.2249 0.2450
A djR 2 0.2920 0.2412 0.2235 0.2411 0.2234 0.2433
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Table 9: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/Sales)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.35509 -1.43979*** -1.96550**’ -1.42373***
w *
-1.89747
(-0.58) (-35.83) (-70.63) (-26.39) (-39.96)
Age -0.01545
(-1.49)




0.00295*** 0.00361**’ 0.00282*** 0.00347***
(-0.05) (4.04) (4.86) (3.79) (4.59)
Sigma 0.26753** 0.32915*** 0.40007*** 0.32936*** 0.40379***
(2.18) (9.44) (11.36) (9.10) (11.05)
NWCoverTA -0.23226*** -0.23222*** -0.24924*** -0.23082*** -0.24888***
(-5.02) (-18.78) (-19.87) (-17.82) (-18.94)
CAPXoverTA 0.19165 0.06930** 0.07063** 0.06027** 0.06318**
(1.48) (2.37) (2.37) (1.98) (2.04)
RDoverSales 0.45045*** 0.27457*** 0.28498*** 0.26123*** 0.27073***
(4.76) (17.60) (17.95) (16.55) (16.86)
Divdummy -0.45264*** -0.35537*** -0.36912*’* -0.37664*’* -0.39782***
(-3.04) (-9.87) (-10.06) (-9.95) (-10.31)
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AQCoverTA -0.13556 -0.06759* -0.02480 -0.05195 -0.00673
(-0.97) (-1.65) (-0.60) (-1.21) (-0.15)
Leverage 0.07767 0.08637*** 0.09204*** 0.08987*** 0.09447***
(1.41) (5.74) (6.01) (5.73) (5.92)
Realsize 2.016737E-7 0.00000577*** 0.00000713*** 0.00000589*’* 0.00000709***
(0.04) (3.75) (4.54) (3.72) (4.38)
MH3 -1.47865*** -1.39767*** -1.45911*”
(-4.20) (-17.10) (-16.48)




Observations 360 7340 7340 6620 6620
R2 0.3663 0.2491 0.2215 0.2506 0.2229
Adj R2 0.3387 0.2480 0.2203 0.2492 0.2215
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Table 10: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/TA
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 1.02931*" 0.40308*’’ 0.31082*** 0.32197*** 0.31834*** 0.26567’**
(2.77) (5.98) (16.19) (8.70) (12.28) (11.89)
Age(t-l) -0.00845 -0.00186 -0.00021561
(-1.35) (-1.44) (-0.35)
Tenure(t-l) 0.01679 0.00952 0.00398 0.00032028
(0.33) (0.90) (0.40) (0.03)
MB 0.00043358 0.00304*** 0.00319*** 0.00318*** 0.00308*** 0.00312***
(0.27) (8.74) (9.51) (9.50) (8.86) (8.99)
Sigma 0.20588*** 0.28563’’* 0.28504*’’ 0.28516’’’ 0.28524*’’ 0.29059***
(2.75) (17.03) (17.97) (17.97) (17.02) (17.41)
NWCoverTA -0.22281’** -0.18120**’ -0.17875*** -0.17868**’ -0.18164’’’ -0.18318*’’
(-7.78) (-29.80) (-31.47) (-31.44) (-29.89) (-30.22)
CAPXoverTA 0.13298* 0.04888’’* 0.05657*’* 0.05655*’* 0.04783*’’ 0.04883***
(1.73) (3.43) (4.21) (4.21) (3.35) (3.42)
RDoverSales 0.13329** 0.15827*** 0.15240*** 0.15236*** 0.15907*** 0.16335’’*
(2.33) (10.81) (11.04) (11.04) (10.87) (11.19)
Divdummy -0.23481" -0.22762’** -0.22550’’’ -0.22492**’ -0.23059*** -0.23368***
(-2.57) (-12.38) (-13.40) (-13.30) (-12.80) (-12.94)
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AQCoverTA 0.01666 0.03446* 0.03309' 0.03315* 0.03567 0.03988
(0.17) (1.71) (1.73) (1.74) (1.77) (1.98)
Leverage 0.10707"' 0 .10792'" 0.10416*" 0.10422*** 0.10751'** 0.10816'"
(3.24) (14.67) (15.04) (15.05) (14.63) (14.71)
Realsize - - - - - -
0.00000135 0.00000232*" 0.00000216*" 0.00000216*** 0.00000220*** 0.00000217***
(-0.45) (-3.06) (-3.03) (-3.03) (-2.92) (-2.87)
M H3(t-l) -0.08451 -0.14575'" -0.13489*" -0.13499"* -0.15067*"
(-0.42) (-3.49) (-3.58) (-3.58) (-3.62)




Observations 354 6242 6961 6961 6242 6242
R2 0.3837 0.4037 0.4043 0.4043 0.4031 0.4022
Adj R2 0.3564 0.4023 0.4034 0.4033 0.4020 0.4011
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Table 11: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/Sales
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 0.35906 0.57259*" 0.42252’" 0.50437*" 0.47034*’*
(0.99) (6.42) (9.28) (19.55) (13.71)
Age(t-l) 0.00133 -0.00221 -0.00006697
(0.22) (-1.29) (-0.08)
Tenure(t-l) 0.04835 0.03461" 0.02811**
(0.98) (2.48) (2.14)
MB 0.00034033 0.00050221 0.00071429 0.00058788 0.00054167
(0.22) (1.09) (1.59) (1.31) (1.18)
Sigma 0.16244" 0.08954**’ 0.09399"* 0.08343*** 0.08890***
(2.23) (4.03) (4.43) (3.92) (4.01)
NWCoverTA -0.19746*" -0.16723*’* -0.16187*’* -0.15968’’* -0.16764’’’
(-7.11) (-20.77) (-21.33) (-20.92) (-20.84)
CAPXoverTA 0.10808 -0.01241 -0.00493 -0.00623 -0.01346
(1.45) (-0.66) (-0.27) (-0.34) (-0.71)
RDoverSales 0.47458*" 0.68410*** 0.68798*** 0.68610*" 0.68510’**
(8.56) (35.28) (37.35) (37.00) (35.36)
Divdummy -0.24250*** -0.15629*" -0.16090’** -0.16085"’ -0.16040"*
(-2.74) (-6.42) (-7.10) (-7.11) (-6.72)
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AQCoverTA -0.10302 -0.08097"' -0.07317"' -0.07764’" -0.07971"
(-1.11) (-3.03) (-2.88) (-3.03) (-2.98)
Leverage 0.05203 0.04102*** 0.04002"' 0.03903’" 0.04050"’
(1.62) (4.21) (4.31) (4.20) (4.16)
Realsize -0.00000690" -0.00000707"' -0.00000655'" -0.00000696*** -0.00000697***
(-2.38) (-7.04) (-6.86) (-7.26) (-7.01)
MH3(t-l) -0.07372 -0.23851*** -0.22628**’ -0.24419***





Observations 354 6242 7002 6961 6242
R2 0.4188 0.2926 0.2804 0.2834 0.2922
Adj R2 0.3931 0.2910 0.2793 0.2823 0.2908
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Table 12: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/NA
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 1.06480 1.41754** 1.08579 0.78626 0.48022
(0.31) (1.95) (1.63) (1.52) (1.09)
Age(t-l) -0.02714 -0.01245 -0.01244
(-0.47) (-1.03) (-1.03)
Tenure(t-l) 0.13515 0.01215 -0.00236
(0.29) (0.06) (-0.01)
MB 0.16729’** 0.05025*** 0.05028’’’ 0.05295’’’ 0.05290’’’
(7.95) (4.25) (4.25) (4.25) (4.24)
Sigma -2.29182* 0.11582 0.16578 0.22978 0.27170
(-1.87) (0.23) (0.33) (0.43) (0.51)
NWCoverTA -0.56437 -0.52831*** -0.53719’’’ -0.56837’’’ -0.57533’’’
(-1.65) (-3.53) (-3.59) (-3.45) (-3.50)
CAPXoverTA 5.22188’" 0.59184 0.59604 0.52885 0.53912
(5.02) (1.38) (1.39) (1.15) (1.18)
RDoverSales 0.27171 0.36122 0.39212 0.43415 0.46734
(0.28) (1.11) (1.21) (1.25) (1.34)
Divdummy 0.62798 -0.19802 -0.22062 -0.35342 -0.38089
(0.73) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.95) (-1.02)
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AQCoverTA -0.14220 -0.08424 -0.05118 0.07198 0.10320
(-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.11) (0.14) (0.21)
Leverage -0.54384 0.32859’* 0.32739** 0.27332 0.27218
(-1.59) (2.01) (2.00) (1.55) (1.54)
Realsize -0.00008571" -0.00001692 -0.00001626 -0.00001893 -0.00001907
(-2.14) (-0.89) (-0.86) (-0.96) (-0.96)
M H3(t-l) 0.47181 -0.81289 -0.79036
(0.25) (-1.10) (-0.96)




Observations 277 5683 5683 5048 5048
Rz 0.4869 0.0167 0.0166 0.0168 0.0168
Adj 0.4575 0.0146 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145
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Table 13: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/TA)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.82597 -1.89568"* -2.25137’"
*  w
-1.84171 -2.19956’** -1.83099*’*
(-1.44) (-50.19) (-86.42) (-25.29) (-32.44) (-36.57)




MB -0.00001015 0.00336*** 0.00368*** 0.00335*** 0.00367*** 0.00335***
(-0.00) (5.10) (5.53) (5.09) (5.51) (5.00)
Sigma 0.46552"’ 0.57060"' 0.60604’** 0.57118*’* 0.60661**’ 0.56039’**
(4.03) (18.29) (19.32) (18.30) (19.33) (17.31)
NWCoverTA -0.24669*** -0.21848*** -0.22876*" -0.21817*** -0.22846*** -0.21417***
(-5.58) (-19.55) (-20.33) (-19.51) (-20.29) (-18.24)
CAPXoverTA 0.27909" 0.03401 0.03799 0.03390 0.03789 0.02338
(2.35) (1.29) (1.42) (1.28) (1.42) (0.85)
RDoverSales 0.24538"’ 0.38498’’’ 0.41055’" 0.38481"’ 0.41040’’* 0.37885’"
(2.78) (14.18) (15.01) (14.17) (15.01) (13.40)
Divdummy -0.40032*** -0.42876"* -0.43864**’ -0.42592’** -0.43593 -0.42609'"
(-2.84) (-12.95) (-13.09) (-12.80) (-12.95) (-12.24)
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AQCoverTA 0.10286 0.01161 0.03864 0.01192 0.03894 0.02470
(0.70) (0.31) (1.02) (0.32) (1.03) (0.63)
Leverage 0.19862*** 0.23206’" 0.23602’’’ 0.23237*’’ 0.23631’’* 0.23265’’’
(3.90) (17.04) (17.16) (17.05) (17.18) (16.39)
Realsize 0.00000200 0.00000159 0.00000231 0.00000160 0.00000231 0.00000126
(0.43) (1.14) (1.62) (1.14) (1.62) (0.87)
MH3(t-l) -0.53218’ -0.91804’’’ -0.91854’" -1.00527*’*
(-1.71) (-12.37) (-12.37) (-12.49)




Observations 354 6961 6961 6961 6961 6242
R2 0.4301 0.3677 0.3551 0.3677 0.3551 0.3699
A djR 2 0.4048 0.3667 0.3540 0.3666 0.3540 0.3687
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Table 14: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/NA)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.87180 -1.84036*** -2.20794"’ -1.71259 -2.08309"' -1.74953***
(-1.02) (-36.40) (-64.92) (-17.60) (-23.11) (-25.89)




MB 0.00676 0.00776*** 0.00799*** 0.00773*** 0.00795*** 0.00813’’*
(1.31) (4.90) (5.00) (4.88) (4.98) (4.99)
Sigma 0.40964 0.70162"' 0.76147’" 0.70278’" 0.76265"' 0.69304"'
(1.36) (10.49) (11.37) (10.51) (11.38) (9.87)
NWCoverTA -0.29182*** -0.25006*** -0.26167’" -0.24855’’’ -0.26019"’ -0.24859’"
(-3.47) (-12.45) (-12.97) (-12.36) (-12.88) (-11.55)
CAPXoverT
A
0.66015** 0.05344 0.05743 0.05310 0.05710 0.03972
(2.58) (0.93) (0.99) (0.93) (0.99) (0.66)
RDoverSales 0.59824" 0.60163'** 0.63600"’ 0.60049"* 0.63493’’’ 0.59828’’’
(2.51) (13.82) (14.56) (13.80) (14.54) (13.14)
Divdummy -0.23994 -0.49970*** -0.52068*** -0.49232’" -0.51349’" -0.49757'"




0.17194 -0.03929 0.00009024 -0.03795 0.00143 -0.02142
(0.58) (-0.63) (0.00) (-0.61) (0.02) (-0.33)
Leverage 0.13711 0.25132"* 0.24995*** 0.25212*** 0.25073*** 0.25627***








(0.76) (2.48) (2.95) (2.49) (2.96) (1.75)
MH3(t-l) -0.27022 -0.92674*’* -0.92771’*’ -1.01014***
(-0.58) (-9.36) (-9.37) (-9.40)






277 5683 5683 5683 5683 5048
0.3363 0.2599 0.2496 0.2602 0.2499 0.2622
A djR 2 0.2981 0.2585 0.2481 0.2586 0.2483 0.2605
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Table 15: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/Sales)
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.88776 -1.61897*** -2.02704*’* -1.59366’** -1.98108’*’
(-1.45) (-39.54) (-71.66) (-29.41) (-41.90)
Age(t-l) -0.01004
(-0.97)
Tenure(t-l) 0.03112 0.01994 -0.00935
(0.37) (0.96) (-0.45)
MB -0.00047844 0.00158** 0.00196’*’ 0.00160** 0.00201’**
(-0.18) (2.22) (2.71) (2.20) (2.74)
Sigma 0.37819"* 0.38086’*’ 0.42206*** 0.37497’** 0.41808***
(3.06) (11.26) (12.39) (10.70) (11.84)
NWCoverTA -0.24242*** -0.21187*** -0.22394*** -0.21191*** -0.22502**’
(-5.13) (-17.49) (-18.33) (-16.68) (-17.55)
CAPXoverTA 0.22949* 0.00057045 0.00484 -0.00519 -0.00004228
(1.81) (0.02) (0.17) (-0.17) (-0.00)
RDoverSales 0.49510*** 0.74564*’’ 0.77517*** 0.73693’’* 0.76918***
(5.25) (25.33) (26.10) (24.09) (24.91)
Divdummy -0.41935*" -0.31718*** -0.32712’** -0.31744*** -0.33408***
(-2.79) (-8.84) (-8.99) (-8.43) (-8.74)
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AQCoverTA -0.04255 -0.09120” -0.05967 -0.09137" -0.05693
(-0.27) (-2.24) (-1.45) (-2.17) (-1.34)
Leverage 0.07291 0.08956*** 0.09419” ’ 0.08724’" 0.09253’’’
(1.34) (6.07) (6.31) (5.68) (5.95)
Realsize 1.625994E-
8
1.742675E-7 0.00000111 -3.40132E-8 7.569823E-7
(0.00) (0.11) (0.72) (-0.02) (0.47)
MH3(t-l) -0.66339” -1.05871"’ -1.14975’”
(-2.00) (-13.16) (-13.20)




Observations 354 6961 6961 6242 6242
R2 0.3537 0.2811 0.2644 0.2856 0.2676
AdjR2 0.3250 0.2800 0.2633 0.2842 0.2662
96
Table 16: Regression Analysis: Year fixed effect
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.






Age 0.0082459577 -.0020008237 0.003183053 0.002399178 0.002099758 0.001131476
(0.33) (-1.63) (1.19) (0.91) (0.88) (0.35)
Tenure -.0043832286 0.0165968719* -0.028554798 0.015503964 -0.004165973 -0.012529752
(-0.02) (1.66) (-1.30) (0.72) (-0.21) (-0.47)
MB 0.0525051584**’ 0.0032844470*“ -0.000059260 0.002294853” * 0.003494668*” 0.010273138*"
(4.34) (9.69) (-0.08) (3.13) (5.32) (6.49)
Sigma 0.1013209962 0.2781205605**’ 0.121868042*“ 0.323123950*” 0.524783438*” 0.607667212*”
(0.19) (16.92) (3.38) (9.08) (16.47) (8.84)
NWCoverTA -.4809655076*” -.1754195792*** -0.105900559*” -0.214809745” * -0.205637888*” -0.236898737” *
(-2.97) (-29.79) (-8.21) (-16.86) (-18.02) (-11.17)
CAPXoverT
A
0.7539486943* 0.0771961542” * -0.223001684*” 0.102997221"* 0.110963368*” 0.148851906"
(1.66) (5.56) (-7.33) (3.43) (4.12) (2.50)
RDoverSales 0.1509737766 0.0443865471*" 1.955880354*” 0.264992660**’ 0.122539478*” 0.157728133*”
(1.09) (6.19) (124.60) (17.09) (8.82) (8.66)
Divdummy -.2438790002 -.2103022623**’ -0.099598618” -0.342712675*” -0.424917681*** -0.500728605*”
(-0.67) (-11.97) (-2.59) (-9.01) (-12.48) (-10.47)
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AQCoverTA -.1126096746 0.0373489726* -0.182920162*" -0.060840256 0.039657274 0.041468684
(-0.23) (1.92) (-4.29) (-1.44) (1.05) (0.65)
Leverage 0.2947064415’ 0.1000945734” * 0.035392706** 0.073771694” ’ 0.215789929*” 0.234905775*’*
(1.68) (14.02) (2.26) (4.78) (15.59) (10.25)
Realsize -.0000170984 -.0000014021* -0.000023119’** 0.000004248“ ’ 0.000002840” 0.000008760*"
(-0.89) (-1.93) (-14.56) (2.71) (2.02) (3.47)
MH3 -.5114080157 -.2136040318*** 0.206538248** -1.314576764*" -1.105267825*” -1.086435387*”
(-0.63) (-5.22) (2.31) (-14.85) (-13.94) (-10.27)
MH4 -.0052739605 0.0088622134 -0.009705502 0.060328952*” 0.048290309*” 0.040018019*
(-0.03) (1.17) -0.59 (3.68) (3.29) (1.81)
Observations 5402 6620 6620 6620 6620 5402
R2 0.020569 0.409523 0.709565 0.282489 0.396971 0.279474
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Table 17: Regression Analysis: Firm (Company) fixed effect
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.





Age 0.0085546959 -.0020416194* 0.003309226 0.002155674 0.001815629 0.001031172
(0.35) (-1.65) (1.23) (0.80) (0.75) (0.31)
Tenure 0.0039870341 0.0172891374* -0.025976845 0.015382675 -0.003918353 -0.014664712
(0.02) (1.71) (-1.19) (0.70) (-0.20) (-0.54)
MB 0.0549643400*** 0.0034490033“ * 0.000221234 0.002761825*“ 0.003925978*’’ 0.011828992*“
(4.57) (10.13) (0.30) (3.72) (5.86) (7.37)
Sigma 0.1241384169 0.2786189671*** 0.122227439*’’ 0.321556010*" 0.525685073"’ 0.608124344*"
(0.24) (16.81) (3.39) (8.89) (16.10) (8.70)
NWCoverT
A
-.5091206135*** -.1805172062*’* -0.109314714*“ -0.229616149*“ -0.221603214*“
-0.251911405*“
(-3.15) (-30.46) (-8.49) (-17.76) (-18.99) (-11.66)
CAPXoverT
A
0.6588790331 0.0655519459*** -0.235037375*“ 0.065443438" 0.073151249*" 0.065382329
(1.46) (4.70) (-7.76) (2.15) (2.67) (109)
RDoverSale
s
0.1405197861 0.0431624084*“ 1.952896785"’ 0.260572973*" 0.118804548*" 0.150715176*"
(1.01) (5.98) (124.51) (16.54) (8.36) (8.13)
Divdummy -.3012026318 -.2247711034*” -0.115710836*“ -0.391189840*“ -0.470737670*“ -0.550496699*"




-.0928544249 0.0388854802** -0.181942002*” -0.056131159 0.045090006 0.032859179
(-0.19) (199) (-4.28) (-1.31) (1.17) (0.51)
Leverage 0.2945775848* 0.1039725598*** 0.038330793" 0.088376421**’ 0.229471825*" 0.247877623*"
(1.69) (14.49) (2.46) (5.65) (16.24) (10.67)
Realsize -.0000155037 -.0000012803* -0.000023159*** 0.000004711**’ 0.000003337" 0.000009808*"
(-0.81) (-1.75) (-14.58) (2.95) (2.32) (3.82)
MH3 -.8692947715 -.2705478775*’* 0.144768286 -1.478803156*” -1.277285464*" -1.250574927*"
(-1.09) (-6.65) (1.64) (-16.66) (-15.94) (-11.75)
MH4 0.0760166855 0.0205112561**’ -0.000691106 0.093116909*” 0.083680576*" 0.085424607*"
(0.46) (2.73) (-0.04) (5.68) (5.65) (3.87)
Observation
s
5402 6620 6620 6620 6620 5402
R2 0.016529 0.396331 0.707937 0.254269 0.363670 0.247114
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Table 18: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/NA)
t values are reported in parentheses




















Table 19: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is MVNA
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -202.82205 -172.34712 74.00052 12.99647 19.51352 -31.87285 -19.50478
(-0.94) (-0.78) (1.14) (0.39) (0.62) (-1.64) (-1-16)
Age 3.46538 4.20006 -2.08078* -0.6908 -0.73202
(0.95) (1-12) (-17) (-1.24) (-1.32)
Tenure -41.36659 -46.96199 1.56853 -1.18391 -0.1816
(-1.13) (-1.26) (0.16) (-0.13) (-0.02)
MH3 -115.15039 34.39287 21.81865 26.55527
(-0.93) (0.84) (0.58) (0.65)
MH4 10.24686 2.97142 2.35297 -9.94903
(0.28) (0-41) (0.38) (-1.51)
Governance 4.06368 1.1135
(0.51) (0.13)
ExcessCash 0.55115 0.46335 -1.82516*" -0.23409"’ -0.22101’" 0.01082"’ -0.05360"
(0.32) (0.27) (-5.83) (-6.32) (-6.74) (3.22) (-2.41)
EXCASHAGE 0.03996 0.03525 0.03402"' 0.00406*" 0.00554'"
(126) (1.09) (6.02) (6.32) (6-75)
EXCASHTenure -0.47853* -0.43336 0.06409" 0.09012"’ 0.07791"
(-1.77) (-1.57) (1.97) (3.21) (2.42)
EXCASHMH3 -2.69762*' -2.48575' 0.43273"' 0.07397'" -0.07497'"
(-2.33) (-1-97) (4.4) (6.36) (-3.2)
EXCASHMH4 -0.07215 -0.07922 -0.12455" -0.09625'" 0.06197"
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(-0.49) (-0.4) (-2.47) (-6.78) (2.41)
EXCASHGover -0.12615" -0.10978*
(-2.38) (-1.93)
MVNA2 5615.06153 5673.58778 22465*" 19106*" 19059*" 21537*** 21649*"
(1.15) (1.15) (21.44) (18.44) (18.45) (20.65) (20.75)
IBNA 30.41780"' 30.38152"* 22.06238"* 26.57633*" 25.88360"’ 21.99948*’* 22.58101*"
(5.4) (5.36) (9.79) (12.3) (12.15) (9.69) (10.04)
IBNA2 -83.33684 -172.54572 -0.52926 5.85312 5.6588 0.76751 0.74147
(-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.03) (0.37) (0.35) (0.05) (0.05)
IBNAneg2 -526.4354 -517.86615 19.45488 121.45206 123.10447 16.00314 19.16123
(-1-51) (-1.48) (0.24) (1.48) (151) (0.2) (0.24)
RDNA 39.79660““* 39.00242**’ 24.21743*** 19.60827*** 21.00705*" 24.85767*“* 23.11938*"





(4.4) (4.31) (-10.4) (-15.55) (-15.37) (-9.71) (-9.93)
XINTNA -7.29594 -8.14286 18.03482*" 25.42718*" 25.32165*" 17.85878*** 17.97651*"
(-0.69) (-0.76) (17.92) (27.18) (27.14) (17.61) (17.73)
XINTNA2 2590.43531*** 2555.43316**“ -172.14485 329.97637 297.21833 -198.69743 -170.06358
(4.73) (4.63) (-0.54) (1.09) (0.98) (-0.61) (-0.53)
XINTNAneg2 109.26653 103.45513 202.87277*" 87.68966 82.75966 228.00639** 233.30161 "*
(0.27) (0.26) (2.28) (1.32) (1.25) (2.55) (2.61)
DVPSXNA 2595.79220" 2760.84004" 292.52926**’ 442.86540*" 432.78278*" 300.70492*’’ 309.80029**’
(2.04) (2.14) (5.01) (7.49) (7.34) (5.12) (5.28)
DVPSXNA2 24290*" 24244*" -203.539 1415.07780**’ 1433.28658*" -181.87451 -161.36245







(-4.35) (-4.36) (-3.28) (0.52) (0.37) (-3.03) (-2.93)
NANA2 -37860*" -37349*** 4821.29719*’’ -1077.51896 -1183.82106 4267.73340*’* 4178.68381**’
(-3-44) (-3.37) (-5.38) (-1.22) (-1.34) (-4.75) (-4.65)
NANAneg2 -3619.74859 -3648.96718
4546.05811*** 4282.22254*** 4137.05055*” 4965.56133*" 5106.60723***
(-0.92) (-0.92) (-6.41) (-6.48) (-6.29) (-6.99) (-7.21)
Observations 120 120 2095 2312 2312 2095 2095
R2 0.8554 0.8571 0.6368 0.6747 0.6755 0.6302 0.6295
Adj. R2 0.8208 0.8191 0.6328 0.6720 0.6728 0.6268 0.6261
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Table 20: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is log(Cash/TA)
t values are reported in parentheses




















Table 21: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is MVTA
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -2.1186 2.07509 4.51004 5.04625 -0.70412 6.37755’" 1.47869
(-0.05) (0.05) (0.68) (1.46) (-0.22) (2.67) (0.7)
Age 0.0715 0.26805 0.00718 0.03536 0.01926
(0.1) (0.38) (0.06) (0.65) (0.35)
Tenure -0.22957 -2.01774 0.9697 0.84291 0.03185
(-0.03) (-0.3) (0.96) (0.92) (0.04)
MH3 -32.7083 -17.43808*" -16.81085*" -18.72318'"
(-1.28) (-4.01) (-4.31) (-4.37)
MH4 3.85182 1.29374" 1.28001" 1.22274”
(0.71) (2.22) (2.29) (2.09)
Governance -0.10179 -0.52398
(-0.07) (-0.33)
ExcessCash 0.09842 0.11054 -0.04071’ 0.03275" 0.02956" 0.02202*" 0.01858*“
(0.53) (0.6) (-1.73) (2.48) (2.25) (3.09) (2.94)
EXCASHAGE -0.00125 -0.0022 0.00152"' -0.00034853 -0.00032968
(-0.41) (-0.7) (2.79) (-1.35) (-1.26)
EXCASHTenure -0.00727 -0.00186 -0.01323" -0.00489 -0.0044
(-0.24) (-0.06) (-2.38) (-1.09) (-0.97)
EXCASHMH3 -0.2641 -0.26199 -0.04314 -0.02318 -0.02996
(-1.4) (-1.38) (-1.52) (-0.88) (-1.07)
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EXCASHMH4 0.0172 0.01091 -0.00515 -0.00132 -0.00264
(0.62) (0.37) (-1.31) (-0.36) (-0.69)
EXCASHGover 0.00323 0.00578
(0.39) (0.68)
MVTA2 395.49594 331.29663 306.10799** 273.55922** 244.33937* 269.29213* 243.58226’
(0.13) (0.11) (2.17) (2.04) (1.82) (1-93) (1.74)
IBTA 18.64210** 16.31563* 9.64454*** 10.64016"’ 11.82736"* 9.99527**’ 11.15002"’
(2.24) (192) (7.12) (8.38) (9.68) (7.45) (8.41)
IBTA2 19.56933 -8.91071 -5.20697 -6.04 -7.22544 -5.75418 -7.32175
(0.25) (-0.11) (-0.78) (-0.93) (-1.11) (-0.87) (-11)
IBTAneg2 11.81957 4.93678 -1.66289 0.22168 -0.2846 -0.86092 -1.0899
(0.23) (0.1) (-0.17) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.09) (-0.11)
RDTA 15.85116"' 12.53450** 23.23730*** 22.42500*** 22.74383*” 22.92485*” 23.28579*”
(3.01) (2.15) (20.26) (21.28) (21.51) (20.57) (20.71)
RDTA2 2741.27669 2775.1029 209.58781*" -196.85337*" -182.44269" -194.81785" -182.53680"
(1.15) (1-17) (-2.67) (-2.63) (-2.43) (-2.49) (-2.32)
XINTTA 23.85639*"* 24.69764"’ 19.46789"' 19.61051’" 20.04586’" 19.79951"’ 20.37671"’
(3-11) (3.11) (13.7) (14.66) (15.02) (14.02) (14.4)
XINTTA2 -394.34832 -432.69341 38.12663 29.14873 22.91674 35.46426 33.07263
(-0.69) (-0.76) (0.71) (0.63) (0.49) (0.66) (0.62)
XINTTAneg2 -62.26998 -24.0432 -2.59961 -1.87835 -1.66832 -2.97541 -2.15839
(-0.2) (-0.08) (-0.26) (-0-24) (-0.21) (-0.3) (-0.21)
DVPSXTA -72.17913 -5.65574 169.04856” 164.17632” 162.99016” 167.47934” 161.68777*
(-0.18) (-0.01) (2.02) (2.06) (2.05) (2) (1.92)
DVPSXTA2 818.77008 1134.70457 -25.82845 -23.9464 -22.60238 -22.85155 -22.62319
(0.26) (0.35) (-0.59) (-0.56) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.51)
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DVPSXTAneg2 -289.48098 -390.48068 14.85586 24.35673 23.65509 19.20069 18.8693
(-0.28) (-0.37) (0.22) (0.36) (0.35) (0.28) (0.27)
TATA2 -3.556 -3.04334 -0.7304 -0.87241 -0.91344 -1.14491
(-0.85) (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.19)
TATAneg2 -3.73001’ -3.90095' 0.32257 0.33896 0.3588 0.32158
(-1.67) (-1.74) (0.68) (0.76) (0.76) (0.68)
Observations 154 154 2662 2909 2909 2662 2662
R2 0.4921 0.5003 0.4586 0.4615 0.4583 0.4561 0.4525
Adj. R2 0.4022 0.4027 0.4539 0.4580 0.4551 0.4522 0.4485
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Table 22 (Opler method)
Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/TA
t values are reported in parentheses


























Table 23: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is MVNA
t values are reported in parentheses




-746.34043 -652.51237’** 254.68238’’’ 241.94399*’* -49.96346* -83.60148*”
(-2.78) (-1.2) (-8.74) (-5.52) (-5.76) (-1.73) (-3-14)
Age 43.72192"' 36.14037"’ 10.67074*’’ 3.75919’’’ 3.81973’’’








(-3.47) (0.53) (0.63) (-2.05)
MH4 -65.2211 -2.88521 -5.70844 -4.86177
(-0.87) (-0.56) (-1.11) (-0.91)
Governance -34.64367" -52.96208’’’
(-2.08) (-3.28)
ExcessCash -2.46638" -1.07451 -1.29363*'* -0.46137*" -0.45303*" -0.05656 -0.12006***
(-2.44) (-1.02) (-11.45) (-6.19) (-6.84) (-1.14) (-2.63)
EXCASHAGE 0.06700'" 0.05577"' 0.02227"* 0.00788"* 0.00798*"
(3.77) (3.12) (11.98) (7.1) (7.53)
EXCASHTenure -0.36045"' -0.40514"* -0.03684 0.05962" 0.08753"'
(-3.14) (-3.76) (-1.46) (2.57) (3.62)
EXCASHMH3 -0.07364 -1.45074’” 0.04944 0.00716 -0.18767"
(-0.4) (-3.43) (0.56) (0.09) (-2.17)
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EXCASHMH4 -0.0455 -0.15615 -0.00416' -0.00437’ -0.00606 *
(-0.84) (-1.04) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-2.47)
EXCASHGover -0.05458' -0.08784"*
(-1.98) (-3.28)
MVNA2 2362.3261 4527.34345 22397*" 22638'" 22686’" 22387"’ 22353’’’
(0.5) (1) (30.63) (30.63) (30.76) (29.37) (29.38)
IBNA 23.22095” ' 18.83119"’ 11.54468'" 12.10812*" 11.86665"* 11.08256*" 11.17063"*
(3.75) (3.18) (7.09) (7.26) (7.17) (6.52) (6.61)
IBNA2 190.87164 20.94192 -11.74616 -7.58481 -7.85679 -8.09417 -7.77496
(0.62) (0.07) (-1.17) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.74)
IBNAneg2 -884.03519" -674.76462' 118.35582" 154.96474’" 157.72937*" 109.81761* 107.93461*
(-2.39) (-1.94) (2.05) (2.61) (2.66) (1.82) (1.79)
RDNA 34.62556*’ 27.07509' 7.68877’" -5.60876*" -5.26552*" 3.29236" 3.98282"
(2.3) (1.9) (4.67) (-4.04) (-3.8) (1.96) (2.37)
RDNA2 26353” ’ 28073*"
4022.45052"’ 4981.65933*" 4959.62848*’’ 4280.60038*" 4276.95343*’*
(4.18) (4.79) (-5.27) (-6.5) (-6.48) (-5.38) (-5.38)
XINTNA 24.02434 36.43831" 28.85785*" 61.92967"’ 61.83746’" 37.90937’" 38.27706’"
(1.4) (2.25) (10) (41.58) (41.55) (13.02) (13.2)
XINTNA2 2746.42353'" 2488.93375*" 85.73063 152.69171 126.61597 207.82213 175.24811
(4.05) (3.9) (0.32) (0.59) (0.49) (0.74) (0.62)
XINTNAneg2 1612.23047 1194.098 -59.06079 -32.43366 -37.619 -16.57793 -24.92211
(1.66) (1.32) (-0.78) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.21) (-0.32)
DVPSXNA 2609.14519" 3726.97098’“ -147.47393*’’ -123.93926" -131.35599” ’ -93.67676’ -95.77985’
(2.04) (3.04) (-2.99) (-2.48) (-2.63) (-1.84) (-1.88)
I l l
DVPSXNA2 22278'" 21030 603.95182 576.93768" 559.44061" 642.56732*" 624.36468’"
(5.13) (5.2) (2.61) (2.43) (2.36) (2.66) (2.59)
DVPSXNAneg2
5329.45285"* 5426.82018"'
-381.50888 209.50912 180.76778 -162.4938 -177.89771
(-3.46) (-3.79) (-1.14) (0.62) (0.53) (-0.47) (-0.51)
NANA2 -47183’" -49146"* -12184*"
9688.84733*" 9840.62627*’’
-10605**’ -10641**’
(-4.22) (-4.73) (-15.75) (-12.67) (-12.88) (-13.47) (-13.54)
NANAneg2 -336.19275 -99.01364
1757.45118**’ 4728.97371**’ 4551.19877*’’ 3675.15448*’’ 3599.12649**’
(-0.07) (-0.02) (-2.82) (-8.52) (-8.13) (-5.93) (-5-77)
Observations 107 107 1669 1836 1836 1669 1669
R2 0.8209 0.8501 0.6472 0.7719 0.7722 0.6141 0.6144
Adj. R2 0.7712 0.8039 0.6423 0.7695 0.7698 0.6096 0.6099
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Table 24 (Opler method)
Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Cash/TA
t values are reported in parentheses


























Table 25 (Opler method): Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is MVTA
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -99.66083 -162.57858" -6.44108 5.94564 0.36679 -2.55579 -6.32907’"
(-1.41) (-2.47) (-0.92) (1.61) (0.11) (-0.97) (-2.59)
Age 3.07569*** 4.13657*“ 0.07236 0.00366 -0.00378
(2.72) (3.99) (0.55) (0.06) (-0.06)
Tenure -15.94457 -16.45999 4.06328’" 4.52590’" 3.75916*"
(-1.42) (-1.64) (3.29) (4.15) (3.41)
MH3 -30.10752 -7.50779 -12.85132" -7.63261
(-0.66) (-1.31) (-2.49) (-1.35)
MH4 44.12074*“ 1.22763** 1.49810*“ 1.25195**
(5.32) (2.39) (2.96) (2.43)
Governance -4.14662 -5.61602**
(-1.53) (-2.29)
ExcessCash -0.25902" -0.37957"’ -0.02986’" -0.00492 -0.0047 -0.02090*“ -0.01671'*’
(-2.21) (-3.49) (-4.21) (-154) (-1-52) (-6.32) (-5.72)
EXCASHAGE 0.00552*** 0.00824*’’ 0.00018096 0.00004216 0.00004885
(3.08) (4.89) (1-39) (0.8) (0.92)
EXCASHTenure -0.02048 -0.02919 0.00774’" 0.00861"' 0.00799’"
(-1.03) (-1.63) (4.51) (5.83) (5.25)
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EXCASHMH3 0.04523 -0.02731 0.02134" 0.00549 0.02154"
(1.17) (-0.36) (2.36) (0.67) (2.4)
EXCASHMH4 0.01814'* 0.07571"' -0.00009828 0.00011879 -0.00010982
(2.18) (5.76) (-0.36) (0.46) (-0.41)
EXCASHGover -0.00435 -0.00764*
(-0.99) (-1.91)
MVTA2 -1005.78587 -23.37141 48.68131 97.52432 63.05966 58.42635 48.71454
(-0.31) (-0.01) (0-41) (0.83) (0.54) (0.49) (0.41)
IBTA 13.69522 13.11575’ 8.08132’" 10.04001’" 11.07445*“ 8.34464*“ 9.96592"’
(1.66) (1.7) (5.96) (7.72) (8.95) (6.19) (7.6)
IBTA2 -10.82214 15.12679 -2.0327 -1.82878 -2.53433 -2.09514 -2.57765
(-0.14) (0.22) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-0.45) (-0-37) (-0.46)
IBTAneg2 -119.03032 -244.33734'" 2.2753 0.84433 0.69961 2.64217 2.23345
(-1.5) (-3.22) (0.26) (0.1) (0.08) (0.3) (0.25)
RDTA 9.03223* 9.29621** 19.83205*" 19.25058’" 19.13992*“ 20.14370*’’ 20.17918'"
(1.81) (2.08) (17.52) (17.96) (17.94) (17.88) (17.82)
RDTA2 2894.23069 3530.78265 -84.49504 -106.0484 -87.75431 -90.74692 -85.82137
(1.21) (1.64) (-1.27) (-1.61) (-1.34) (-1.36) (-1.29)
XINTTA 29.66632*“ 28.99011*** 21.79274*** 21.13712*“ 21.82877*“ 21.84071'** 22.35246**'
(2.92) (3.18) (14.97) (15.31) (15.96) (15) (15.36)
XINTTA2 -314.61421 -414.50239 14.9425 19.67437 14.24616 16.44829 17.93532
(-0.58) (-0.86) (0.33) (0.46) (0.34) (0.36) (0.4)
XINTTAneg2 120.28678 230.50491 -6.66133 -2.5897 -2.59668 -7.10359 -5.96085
(0.33) (0.7) (-0.53) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0-47)
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DVPSXTA 58.47228 220.31334 92.99993 101.44269 100.00114 100.53938 114.69064
(0.16) (0.67) (1.27) (1.43) (1.42) (1.38) (1.57)
DVPSXTA2 1704.83071 467.60714 -39.73459 -42.52107 -39.23174 -40.45315 -40.5393
(0.54) (0.16) (-1.12) (-1.19) (-1.1) (-1.14) (-1.13)
DVPSXTAneg2 346.82249 1171.992 69.98046 62.62541 62.84415 67.48053 74.19065
(0.36) (1.31) (1.25) (1.12) (1.13) (1-21) (1.32)
TATA2 -5.14178 -4.99345 0.03482 -0.23356 -0.0041 -0.05143
(-1.03) (-1-12) (0.04) (-0.26) (0) (-0.06)
TATAneg2 -6.57761" -7.75581’" -0.21305 -0.29466 -0.25206 -0.23607
(-2.56) (-3.33) (-0.51) (-0.74) (-0.61) (-0.56)
Observations 132 132 2061 2253 2253 2061 2061
R2 0.5505 0.6452 0.4907 0.4865 0.4840 0.4885 0.4835
Adj. R2 0.4548 0.5615 0.4849 0.4822 0.4801 0.4837 0.4786
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Table 26: Descriptive Statistics
If M e w S td D cv Su b M ftfhnum M axim um
80635 156.3203 202.5202 12604888 0 549
A flt 23003 53.47259 12.60563 1230030 0 96
AT 82367 215.5888 232.1816 17757404 0.90 941
C EO 82415 153.9054 199.4124 12684116 -56 916
82415 60.38902 128.7707 4976961 -67 783
c m 82204 73.47277 140.3202 6039755 0.1 777
. P L C ___ 82247 29.81614 97.61206 2452288 0.1 631
P L T T 80809 104.561 191.6477 8449466 0.1 883
82228 43.60531 109.6555 3585577 -4 429
IB 82415 33.05772 91.32886 2724452 -76 688
im v t 81597 66.42142 143.5055 5419789 0 529
80827 109.2518 176.7253 8830496 0 659
v t  V 82197 158.5705 216.3866 13034016 0 789
22839 0.31636 0.23694 7225 0 1
22839 616.1726 93052 14072765 -0.00378 722.11
M K BK 71813 4.07609 22.51573 292717 -98 844
PPEG T 81882 152.4493 212.6997 12482852 0 679
P f i l f l f 82233 120.3019 194.2453 9892788 0 399
BKCT 81772 85.13804 155.2315 6961908 0 999
BO A 82309 -2.62752 22.20647 -216268 -99 832
S A L *  . 82383 206.4784 232.9288 17010312 0.1 940
T M iir*  " 20507 1.76227 0.88877 36139 0 4.12713
X A P* 24786 35.02696 98.23795 868178 0 699
x i n t 75226 26.50775 81.22687 1994072 0 993
XRD 49981 31.19463 87.74606 1559139 0 991
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Table 27: Correlation matrix
A f tA v I ............*m A T r v nu y CvL C H E D L C m  nmrD l* i  i IB 1
" 1 0.04124 0.46086 0.62708 0.45172 0.4677 0.29727 0.45984 0.3905 0.38957PJmam*- <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
80635 22473 80630 80635 80635 80481 80527 79053 80457 80635
0.04124 1 0.03164 0.05439 0.05815 0.00877 0.03048 0.0488 0.0273 0.06592
A * <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1837 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
^  * 22473 23003 23003 23003 23003 22996 22995 22609 23002 23003
■ '! V 0.46086 0.03164 1 0.47378 0.35816 0.30507 0.18907 0.34414 0.25851 0.27806
/i% ■ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
80630 23003 82367 82367 82367 82191 82201 80766 82180 82367
0.62708 0.05439 0.47378 1 0.40304 0.39578 0.24428 0.41894 0.34994 0.3573
CIQ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
* % ^ ? “ 80635 23003 82367 82415 82415 82204 82247 80809 82228 82415
‘ 0.45172 0.05815 0.35816 0.40304 1 0.50326 0.43095 0.50267 0.58595 0.82544
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
.V , 80635 23003 82367 82415 82415 82204 82247 80809 82228 82415
W'?* <, 0.4677 0.00877 0.30507 0.39578 0.50326 1 0.33072 0.33601 0.44248 0.46725
m t <.0001 0.1837 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
l! —L—_ 80481 22996 82191 82204 82204 82204 82041 80614 82025 82204■ *V*C& , .. - 
- \  ■ 0.29727 0.03048 0.18907 0.24428 0.43095 0.33072 1 0,34167 0.50457 0.39759T̂ •'* ft1' •DLC <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
80527 22995 82201 82247 82247 82041 82247 80657 82061 82247
0.45984 0.0488 0.34414 0.41894 0.50267 0.33601 0.34167 1 0.45697 0.39902
DLTT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
79053 22609 80766 80809 80809 80614 80657 80809 80632 80809
v 0.3905 0.0273 0.25851 0.34994 0.58595 0.44248 0.50457 0.45697 1 0.4971
m <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
.. , 80457 23002 82180 82228 82228 82025 82061 80632 82228 82228
0.38957 0.06592 0.27806 0.3573 0.82544 0.46725 0.39759 0.39902 0.4971 1
IB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
80635 23003 82367 82415 82415 82204 82247 80809 82228 82415
0.44939 0.06166 0.30544 0.38314 0.53211 0.36193 0.4201 0.44355 0.43928 0.48228
D*W <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001et 79974 22817 81551 81597 81597 81391 81443 80014 81410 81597
« 4* 4 ,'.
0.62792 0.04019 0.36298 0.48517 0.61344 0.47699 0.41797 0.53505 0.51416 0.5169
USt <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
80617 22518 80785 80827 80827 80625 80719 79240 80641 80827
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Peanoa Correlation Coefficients 
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Table 28: T -  tests for the differences in means
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Tenure Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
2.7008 0.1380
0 -1 .1 2 .4 8 -4 .1 3 t Value = 1.26
Age Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
0.4504 1.1408
0 - 5 0 6 1 -9 6 t Value = -0.87
MH3 Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
1.8046 1.3516
0 -0 .1 4 5 0.423 -  1 t Value = 0.23
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Table 28A: Differences in medians
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Tenure Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile
0 -1 .1 2 .4 8 -4 .1 3 Z value -2.1893**
Age Earnings Management (EM)
1sl Quartile 4th Quartile
0 - 5 0 6 1 -9 6 Z value 2.8422’"
MH3 Earnings Management (EM)
1sl Quartile 4lh Quartile
0 -0 .1 4 5 0.423 -  1 Z value 4.7754***
125
Table 29: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is EM
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant -0.01916 0.45160 -0.03151 1.23584 1.74984* 1.24656 -0.29624
(-0.02) (0.33) (-0.02) (1.45) (1.84) (1.46) (-0.13)
Age 0.01085 0.01196 0.01109 0.04253
(0.49) (0.53) (0.50) (0.97)
Tenure -0.30506 -0.25184 -0.31080 -0.37707
(-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.90) (-101)
M H 3 -1.41907 -1.66905 -1.75865
(-1.16) (-1.21) (-1.27)
M H 4 0.00408 0.00518 0.00553
(0.08) (0.10) 0.11
SALE -0.00192’ -0.00196' -0.00192* -0.00199 -0.00203 -0.00198 -0.00210*
(-1.69) (-1.72) (-1.68) (-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.68)
ROA 0.05279" 0.05082" 0.05347" 0.05002' 0.04696* 0.05053' 0.04619
(2.07) (1.97) (2.08) (1.78) (1.64) (1.78) (1.62)
Leverage -0.14658 -0.18232 -0.15129 -0.14999 -0.18753 -0.15520 -0.20668
(-0.80) (-0.98) (-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.93) (-0.78) (-1.02)
Realsize 0.00008652'" 0.00008239'" 0.00008605"' 0.00007308"* 0.00006855’" 0.00007254*" 0.00006686*“
(3.76) (3.53) (3.73) (2.93) (2.72) (2.90) (2.64)
Observations 18521 18385 18385 16678 16563 16563 16563
R2 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010
Adj. R2 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
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Table 30: Regression Analysis: Year fixed effect (Dependent variable is EM)
t values are reported in parentheses





















Table 31: Regression Analysis: Firm fixed effect (Dependent variable is EM)
t values are reported in parentheses





















Table 32: T -  tests for the differences in means
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
MKBK Earnings Management (EM)
Mean of 1st Quartile Mean of 4th Quartile Mean of 1st Quartile Mean o f 4* Quartile
-1.4676372 13.8912177 -0.1804315 0.0770876
t Value = -0.19
CHE Earnings Management (EM)
Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean of 4th Quartile Mean of 1st Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
1.3876800 245.8854060 -0.3281706 0.9489223
t Value = -1.42
AT Earnings Management (EM)
Mean of 1st Quartile Mean of 4th Quartile Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
16.2711173 559.2278137 -0.1335274 0.1231320
t Value = -0.48
CFL Earnings Management (EM)
Mean o f 1st Quartile Mean of 4th Quartile Mean o f l sl Quartile Mean o f 4th Quartile
-11.9409502 225.2851085 -0.8686869 2.0920629
t V a lu e - -3 .06"’
129
Table 32A: Differences in medians
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
MKBK Earnings Management (EM)
1S1 Quartile 4th Quartile Z value -1.9661**
CHE Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Z value -2.7875’"
AT Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Z value -1.3268*
CFL Earnings Management (EM)
1st Quartile 4th Quartile Z value -21.5803***
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Table 33: Regression Analysis: The dependent variable is Dividends
t values are reported in parentheses
*, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Variables
Constant 0.44841 0.44878 0.44942 0.44954 0.44938 0.54709
(0.89) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) (2.11)**
Age -0.00743 -0.00744 -0.00744 -0.00744 -0.00744 -0.00197
(-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.44)
Tenure -0.04706 -0.04695 -0.04694 -0.04688 -0.04692
(-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61)
MH3 1.21654 1.21704 1.21594 1.21599 1.21624
(3.97)*** (3.97)*** (3.97)*** (3.97)*** (3.97)***
MH4 -0.0008099 -0.0010673 -0.0035300 -0.0035262 -0.0035278
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05)
EM 0.00127 -0.0000891 0.0013303 0.0014231 -0.0002780 -0.0054474
(0.07) (-0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.13)









MKBK 0.00828 0.00825 0.00829 0.00828 0.00827 0.0098710
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.06)
ROA 0.00841 0.00849 0.00841 0.00844 0.00847 0.00695
(1.21) (1.22) (1.21) (1.21) (1.22) (1.12)
OIBDPAT 0.11408 0.11393 0.11395 0.11388 0.11381 0.04946
(1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.15) (0.56)
CHEAT -0.06428 -0.06443 -0.06433 -0.06434 -0.06440 -0.09994
(-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-1.52)
Leverage 0.06604 0.06607 0.06615 0.06614 0.06617 0.06677
(1.32) (1.32) (1.32) (1.32) (1.32) (1.46)
Realsize 0.0001008 0.0001013 0.0000999 0.0001002 0.0001003 0.0000712
(2.08)** (2.10)** (2.08)** (2.09)** (2.09)** (1.64)
Observations 12640 12640 12640 12640 12640 14101
R2 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0007
Adj. R2 0.0008 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0001
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Table 34: Regression Analysis: Year fixed effect (Dependent variable is Dividend payout)
t values are reported in parentheses




































Table 35: Regression Analysis: Firm fixed effect (Dependent variable is Dividend payout)
t values are reported in parentheses






































Department o f Finance 
Strome College o f Business 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529 
Email: sguha001@odu.edu
EDUCATION
MBA, Finance, Goa Institute o f Management, Goa, India, 1997 
BA (Hons), Economics, Utkal University, Orissa, India, 1994
WORK EXPERIENCE
Norfolk State University, Adjunct / Full-time Faculty, August 2012 -  Continuing 
Strayer University, Adjunct Faculty, October 2008 -  Continuing 
Merrill Lynch, Financial Advisor, 2005 - 2007
